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In today's war waged on world order by terrorists, nuclear weap-
ons are the ultimate means of mass devastation. And non-state
terrorist groups with nuclear weapons are conceptually outside the
bounds of a deterrent strategy and present difficult new security
challenges.
-George P. Shultz, William J. Perry,
Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn'
"A country, which possesses the biggest nuclear arsenal, embarks
on proliferation of nuclear weapons in defiance of the safeguards
[of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT] and threatens to
use them against others, is not competent to comment on peaceful
use of nuclear know-how by other states."
-Mahmoud Ahmadinej ad2
Any man who has at least once in his career dealt with arms.., at
least to hunt or a rifle or whatever he knows that it's much better,
much safer to have it in stock disarmed, disassembled perhaps, ra-
ther than to have it in your arms and charged with bullets in it and
with your finger on the trigger at the same time.
-Vladimir Putin3
INTRODUCTION
Nuclear weapons pose an increased international threat to security in
the modem era. Cheap transportation and the opening of national borders
for trade have made it easy for nuclear materials to cross national bounda-
ries.4 Informal networks have sprouted up, facilitating the proliferation and
exchange of nuclear materials and the technology required to turn those ma-
terials into weapons.5 Advances in technology have made it easier to enrich
1. George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger & Sam Nunn, A World Free
of Nuclear Weapons, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2007, at A15.
2. ALIREZA JAFARZADEH, THE IRAN THREAT: PRESIDENT AHMADINEJAD AND THE
COMING NUCLEAR CRISIS 192 (2007) (quoting President Ahmadinejad).
3. The President's News Conference with President Vladimir V Putin of Russia in
Moscow, 38 WKLY. COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 887, 889-90 (2002).
4. Donald N. Zillman, The Role of Law in the Future of Nuclear Power, in BEYOND
THE CARBON ECONOMY: ENERGY LAW IN TRANSITION 319, 327 (Donald N. Zillman et al.
eds., 2008) (describing nuclear law as the most international field of energy law).
5. For example, the Abdul Qadeer (A.Q.) Khan informal network, which was integral
in facilitating the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Pakistan and North Korea, may have as-
sisted Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria in their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. See MICHAEL
LAUFER, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, A.Q. KHAN NUCLEAR CHRONOLOGY (8
Proliferation Brief, 2005), available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2005/09/07/a.-q.-khan-
nuclear-chronology/6jq; William Langewiesche, The Wrath of Khan, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov.
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uranium, instilling concerns of increased nuclear weapons proliferation.6
These changes in technology, the development of informal nuclear net-
works, and lax security in safeguarding weapons by states such as Russia
and Pakistan have fueled global fears that more states and even terrorist or-
ganizations could build nuclear weapons.
If these fears are realized, the probability of a purposeful attack or even
an accidental nuclear explosion increases significantly. A nuclear attack or
explosion would have drastic international repercussions both physically
and politically. 7 A nuclear exchange between two states would lead to the
deaths of thousands of civilians. Moreover, the environmental fallout would
be catastrophic! With these enhanced threats to security, the world needs a
strong international regulatory regime to curb nuclear proliferation and
promote nuclear disarmament. 9 Such regimes already govern biological and
chemical weapons.1"
Unfortunately, the international community has not developed a regula-
tory regime capable of handling modern nuclear threats. The several bodies
of international law that do currently regulate nuclear weapons oscillate be-
tween promoting the goals of nonproliferation and disarmament." The
2005, at 62, 63; David Albright & Corey Hinderstein, Documents Indicate A.Q. Khan Offered
Nuclear Weapon Designs to Iraq in 1990: Did He Approach Other Countries?, INST. FOR Sct.
& INT'L SEC. (Feb. 4, 2004), http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/khan-
memo.html.
6. William J. Broad, Laser Advances in Nuclear Fuel Stir Terror Fear, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/21/science/earth/21laser.html.
7. PATRICIA BIRNIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 488 (3d ed.
2009) (discussing the multinational effect of the Chernobyl disaster); see also Daphne Gloag,
Radiation Exposure and the Protection of the Community, 281 BRIT. MED. J. 1545, 1546
(1980) (describing the enormous environmental hazards of fallout from a nuclear weapon);
Darren Mitchell Baird, Note, The Changing Posture of the International Community Regard-
ing the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 22 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 529, 538-39
(1999) (claiming that states who were not the target of an attack would still be seriously af-
fected).
8. See Gloag, supra note 7, at 1546.
9. See generally Thomas Graham Jr., International Law and the Proliferation of Nu-
clear Weapons, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 49, 51, 53 (2000) (outlining the historical
importance of international law in the nonproliferation regime and describing how "world
law" will be integral to achieving nuclear security).
10. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26
U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163; Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiat-
ing, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26
U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 (delineating a clear prohibition against using such weapons with-
out a verification method); William Epstein & Paul C. Szasz, Extension of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty: A Means of Strengthening the Treaty, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 735, 761 (1993)
(arguing that non-nuclear-weapons states [NNWS] want a nuclear regime similar to the ones
governing chemical and biological weapons).
11. See generally David S. Jonas, Variations on Non-Nuclear: May the Final Four Join
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as Non-Nuclear Weapons States While Retaining Their
Nuclear Weapons, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 417, 418 n.1 (2005) (placing the Nuclear
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Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the centerpiece of the interna-
tional regulatory regime and focuses heavily on nonproliferation, but also
purports to work towards the nonbinding goal of disarmament.12 The NPT,
however, has failed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and has not
adequately promoted disarmament.13 The treaty was adopted during the
Cold War and addresses Cold War fears of proliferation by states outside the
United States' and Soviet Union's nuclear umbrellas. 14 It codifies a nuclear
monopoly that has lost legitimacy over time, does not address current re-
gional hotspots, and is silent about the threat of terrorism. 5
The United Nations Security Council has passed several resolutions re-
sponding to direct nuclear threats from specific actors but has never
attempted to provide a framework for the global regulation of nuclear weap-
ons.16 Security Council Resolution 1887 on nuclear nonproliferation and
nuclear disarmament represents a potential shift in emphasis for the regula-
tion of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War era. Unlike the NPT, this
resolution emphasizes disarmament as its primary mission, though it also
continues to reaffirm the principle of nonproliferation.1 7 The Security Coun-
cil's unanimous adoption of Resolution 1887 indicates a willingness by
international leaders to fully eliminate global nuclear stockpiles. It also rec-
ognizes that disarmament will limit regional proliferation fears and diminish
the threat from terrorists. 8 Resolution 1887, however, has several problems.
It tries to salvage the framework of the NPT19 when it could have served bet-
Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] at the center of the regime, but discussing a host of other in-
ternational agreements).
12. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT]; PAUL KERR ET AL., CONG. RE-
SEARCH SERV., R41216, 2010 NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) REVIEW CONFERENCE: KEY
ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS 1 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41216.pdf.
13. See infra Part II.
14. Helen M. Cosineau, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Global Non-
Proliferation Regime: A U.S. Policy Agenda, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 407, 414-15 (1994) ("[Many
nations] regard the N.P.T as the first effective response to the threat of nuclear proliferation
posed by the Cold War nuclear arms race.").
15. See infra Part 11.
16. Vik Kanwar, Two Crises of Confidence: Securing Non -Proliferation and the Rule of
Law Through Security Council Resolutions, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 171, 202 (2009) (tracing
the Security Council's involvement in nonproliferation to the conclusion of the Iraq War and
Resolution 687); see also S.C. Res. 1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006) (relating to
Iran's nuclear ambitions); S.C. Res. 1718, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1718 (Oct. 14, 2006) (sanctioning
North Korea for its nuclear weapons program).
17. S.C. Res. 1887, 1 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1887 (Sept. 24, 2009).
18. Id. T 24.
19. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR LAW: His-
TORY, EVOLUTION AND OUTLOOK 100 (2010), available at http://www.oecd-
nea.orgIlaw/isnl/10th/isnl-10th-anniversary.pdf ("The primary impetus for the resolution was
the obvious need for the Council to support efforts to preserve the existing nuclear non-
proliferation regime, as represented by the NPT."); WILLIAM C. POTTER, INSTITUT FRAN ,AIS
DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES [IFRI] SEC. STUD. CTR., IN SEARCH OF THE NUCLEAR
[Vol. 33:587
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ter as a starting point for a new international regime. 20 The resolution also
should call for a stronger enforcement mechanism-specifically targeted,
automatic sanctions. To address these problems, Resolution 1887 needs
some amendment in its scope to effectively address the threat of nuclear
weapons. 2
1
This Note analyzes the successes and shortcomings of Resolution 1887.
Part I lays out the security threat posed by the presence of nuclear weapons
and nuclear proliferation. Part II analyzes the shortcomings of present inter-
national efforts to regulate nuclear weapons and demonstrates that a new
approach to dealing with nuclear materials is necessary. Part III highlights
the benefits of an international regulatory regime focused on disarmament
and also demonstrates how Resolution 1887 falls short of an ideal regime.
Finally, Part IV concludes by outlining several additions that would
strengthen Resolution 1887's ability to curb nuclear proliferation and
achieve disarmament.
I. A SECURITY ANALYSIS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS-
THE THREAT OF ARMAGEDDON
Disarmament and nonproliferation are admirable and necessary goals of
an international nuclear regulatory regime. Some scholars, usually those
aligned with the neorealist school of international relations thought, argue
that nuclear weapons enhance global security by deterring armed conflict.
22
This Part disputes this contention and shows that the presence of nuclear
weapons poses a significant danger to global security. Currently, the primary
fear associated with nuclear weapons is the possibility that terrorists will
TABOO: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 21 n.41 (Proliferation Papers No. 31, 2010), available at
http://www.ifri.org/?page=contibution-detail&id=5798&id-provenance=97 ("[T]he U.S. bro-
kered Security Council Resolution 1887 was criticized by a number of Non-Aligned Member
states for its alleged imbalance between nonproliferation and disarmament. In fact, however,
the disarmament language in the initial U.S. draft resolution was diluted mainly due to the in-
sistence of France.").
20. See infra Part IV.
21. Id.
22. See Ivan Krmpoti6, To the Edge and Back: The I.C.J. Advisory Opinion on the Le-
gality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 9 MICH. ST. U.-DCL J. INT'L L. 315, 322
(2000) ("[T]he very nature of nuclear damage could not be contained in either 'time or space'
as could conventional weapons." (footnote omitted)) ; Thomas Scheber, Note, Strategic Stabil-
ity: Time for a Reality Check, 63 INT'L J. 893, 895 (2008) (describing the Kennedy
administration's policy of relying on rationality and deterrence). But see Ved P. Nanda, Nucle-
ar Weapons, Human Security, and International Law, 37 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 331, 346
(2009) ("[T]here is no consensus that the deterrent qualities of nuclear weapons kept the peace
during the Cold War; and miscalculations or misperceptions can certainly lead to deadly nu-
clear exchanges."); Albert Wohlstetter, Between an Unfree World and None: Increasing Our
Choices, 63 FOREIGN AFF. 962, 987-88 (1985) (describing the uncertainty that comes as a re-
sult of nuclear weapons).
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either build or steal a nuclear device and detonate it in a major city. 3 This
fear, however, is not the only one. Nuclear weapons can also be accidentally
launched or used deliberately in a confrontation between states.
A. Nuclear Weapons Do Not Increase Global Security
One critique of eliminating nuclear weapons altogether is that doing so
would lead to more war. This argument is championed by Kenneth Waltz,
the pioneer of the neorealist school of thought, who argues that nuclear
weapons deter states from going to war with one another.24 Waltz argues that
nuclear weapons differ from conventional weapons because they allow a
state not only to defend against a potential attack, but also to severely punish
an attacking state.25 The threat of punishment from a nuclear strike changes
a state's calculation for going to war with other nuclear-armed states.26 In a
world with conventional weapons, states merely consider winning or losing
battles. 27 In a nuclear world, a state is concerned with the broader concepts
of either survival or annihilation. 28 By providing the predictability of mutu-
23. Graham Allison, How to Stop Nuclear Terror, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2004, at 64,
64, 67 (arguing that a successful program to prevent nuclear terrorism must be based around
three nos: no loose nuclear weapons, no new nuclear weapons, and no new nuclear-weapons
states); Scott Sagan et al., A Nuclear Iran: Promoting Stability or Courting Disaster?, J. INT.
AFF., Spring/Summer 2007, at 135, 140.
24. Sarah Elizabeth Kreps & Anthony Clark Arend, Why States Follow the Rules: To-
ward a Positional Theory of Adherence to International Legal Regimes, 16 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 331, 335 n.15 (2006) ("Structural realism is most closely associated with the work of
Kenneth Waltz."); see Kenneth N. Waltz, Structural Realism After the Cold War, INT'L SEC.,
Summer 2000, at 5, 33. For more information on neorealism, or structural realism, see gener-
ally KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979); Waltz, supra.
25. See SCOTT D. SAGAN & KENNETH N. WALTZ, THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS:
A DEBATE RENEWED 7 (2d ed. 2003).
26. See James Warren Beebe, Tomorrow's Weapons vs. the Constitution, 36 S. CAL. L.
REV. 373, 376 (1962) (contrasting nuclear war and classical warfare).
27. SAGAN & WALTZ, supra note 25, at 9.
28. Kenneth Waltz, Interview, Is Kenneth Waltz Still M.A.D. About Nukes, GEO. J. INT'L
AFF., Winter/Spring 2000, at 51, 54 ("With conventional weapons you at least have the illu-
sion of control; that is, you can defend, you can delay, and you can exact a toll from the
enemy.... If you are fighting with nuclear weapons the issue is survival...."); see also JEF-
FREY RECORD, CATO INST., NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, PREVENTIVE WAR, AND
COUNTERPROLIFERATION 5 (Policy Analysis Brief No. 519, 2004), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa519.pdf; SAGAN & WALTZ, supra note 25, at 9; Alan J. Kes-
sel, Limited Nuclear War: A Critical Analysis, 10 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 347, 347, 351
(1989) (describing how in American foreign policy in the early 1950s, modern war meant total
war, but "the risk of total war in the nuclear age was quickly perceived by the United States as
warranted only in the defense of its national survival"); David S. McDonough, Nuclear Supe-
riority or Mutually Assured Deterrence-The Development of the US Nuclear Deterrent, 60
INT'L J. 811, 812 (2005) (arguing that the Truman administration viewed nuclear weapons as
"distinct from conventional weapons"); Mary Eileen E. McGrath, Nuclear Weapons: The Cri-
sis of Conscience, 107 MIL. L. REV. 191, 203 (1985) ("[N]uclear weapons have enough
destructive power to decimate entire cities and civilization[s]."); Winston P. Nagan, Nuclear
[Vol. 33:587
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ally assured destruction, nuclear weapons limit the potential of a state
declaring war or striking first-as they may have done in a conventional-
weapons world-to obtain a strategic advantage. 29 Moreover, nuclear
weapons allow states to mitigate conventional disadvantages by deterring
potential attackers with a nuclear retaliation.
30
Waltz also argues that the presence of nuclear weapons should not in-
crease the frequency of war even in the hands of "minor" nuclear states.3"
He contends that the presence of nuclear weapons should induce caution
among all states, thus reducing the likelihood of war.32 Moreover, even if a
war were to take place, nuclear weapons would limit the duration and inten-
sity of those wars for two reasons. First, nuclear weapons would limit wars
because a "country having them may retaliate if its vital interests are threat-
ened."33 Second, Waltz argues that a "few judiciously delivered warheads are
likely to produce sobriety in the leaders of all of the countries involved and
bring rapid de-escalation.' '34 The presence of nuclear weapons, then, even in
the hands of smaller powers, would help deter conflicts between states.
Waltz's theory, though, is susceptible to several criticisms. Waltz dis-
counts both the cost and difficulty of safely maintaining a nuclear weapons
stockpile.35 Domestic military installations housing nuclear weapons require
high levels of security and unique precautions, which come at a high CoSt.
3 6
Arsenals, International Lawyers, and the Challenge of the Millennium, 24 YALE J. INT'L L.
485,490 (1999) (describing states as the exclusive actors in the nuclear weapons age).
29. See sources cited supra note 22.
30. SAGAN & WALTZ, supra note 25, at 33; see also Carol Brophy, The Forgotten Fac-
tor: Environmental Implications of Military Activity, 6 ADELPHIA L. 63, 67 (1990)
(describing how third-world countries "view military activity as a necessary tool" for their
survival and display a "willingness to deploy any weapon system available").
31. SAGAN & WALTZ, supra note 25, at 36; see also SAIRA KHAN, IRAN AND NUCLEAR
WEAPONS: PROTRACTED CONFLICT AND PROLIFERATION 28 (2010) (describing Waltz's theo-
ry).
32. SAGAN & WALTZ, supra note 25, at 36.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 37; see also Sagan et al., supra note 23, at 137 (arguing that without nuclear
weapons, there is no way to deter actions of an acting party).
35. Sagan et al., supra note 23, at 139. Scott Sagan criticizes Waltz's theory by high-
lighting three problems when a state first gets nuclear weapons: 1) increase in aggressive acts;
2) terrorist theft; and 3) loose controls and sales to terrorists. Id.
36. See Hearing to Receive Testimony on Strategic Forces Programs of the National
Nuclear Security Administration in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal
Year 2012 and the Future Years Defense Program Before the Subcomm. on Strategic Forces of
the S. Comm. on Armed Serv., 112th Cong. 2 (2011) (opening statement of Sen. E. Benjamin
Nelson, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Strategic Forces of the S. Comm. on Armed Serv.), avail-
able at http://armed-services.senate.govTranscripts/2011/03%20March/l 1- 19%20-%203-30-
l1.pdf (describing U.S. appropriations for nuclear weapons activities as $6.4 billion for 2010,
$7 billion for 2011, and $7.4 billion annually for 2012 and beyond).
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Moreover, maintaining nuclear weapons and securing them requires a
highly complex international system.3 7 An inability to properly maintain the
organization of this system coupled with deficiencies ordinarily found with-
in any functioning system leads to two potential problems. The first is that a
failure in the system could lead to an accidental nuclear launch.38 The se-
cond, and more publicized, fear is that the nuclear technology or weapons
themselves could get into the hands of a rogue state or terrorist organiza-
tion.3 1 With more weapons in the hands of more states-some of them less
developed than the United States and former Soviet Union-the opportuni-
ties for weapons to be stolen by, or sold to, rogue states or terrorist
organizations increase.4" Already, lax security in the states of the former So-
viet Union and Pakistan has raised these types of fears.4' While rogue states
could be deterred according to Waltz's theory, it is unlikely that the logic
behind deterrence comes into play with regard to terrorist organizations.
42
Terrorists, such as Al Qa'ida, have shown that they place little value on hu-
man life, or even their own lives, when engaging armed states.43
Additionally, terrorist groups are loosely organized and cannot be easily tar-
geted with a deterrent strike.' Moreover, terrorists are rarely affiliated with
a particular nation-state and thus have less to lose if they do in fact provoke
a nuclear confrontation between states.
45
37. See Sue E. Eckert, United Nations Nonproliferation Sanctions, 65 INT'L J. 69, 72-
83; see also Robert Chesney, National Insecurity: Nuclear Material Availability and the
Threat of Nuclear Terrorism, 20 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 29, 50-51 (1997); James C.
Kraska, Averting Nuclear Terrorism: Building a Global Regime of Cooperative Threat Reduc-
tion, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 703, 758-59 (2005) (describing the problems of maintaining
unsecured materials in Russia).
38. Nanda, supra note 22, at 331, 334.
39. See infra Part I.B.
40. See Allison, supra note 23, at 66 (describing the high frequency of recent attempts
to steal a nuclear weapon and the enormity of the security problem).
41. See Jon B. Wolfsthal, Facing Double Jeopardy-Nuclear Proliferation and Terror-
ism, GEO. J. INT'L AFF., Winter/Spring 2005, at 15, 16, 18-19.
42. See sources cited supra note 23.
43. Thomas L. Hemingway, In Defense of Military Commissions, 35 U. MEM. L. REV.
2, 5 (2004) ("Many are fanatics who believe that their greatest power is in their disregard for
human life.").
44. ERSEL AYDINLI & JAMES N. ROSENAU, GLOBALIZATION, SECURITY, AND THE NA-
TION-STATE: PARADIGMS IN TRANSITION 55 (2005) (discussing the difficulty of launching a
successful offensive strike against a terrorist organization); see also Charles A. Homer, Policy
Considerations in Using Nuclear Weapons, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 15, 21 (1998) ("1 do
not believe in any deterrent effect of nuclear weapons because nuclear weapons are best used
against cities where civilian casualties would be high.").
45. Anne-Marie Lizin, Guantanamo: What Safeguards for the Fight Against Terrorism,
18 HELSINKI MONITOR 101, 102 (2007) ("Terrorist organizations act from the territory of Sov-
ereign states .... [I]t is impossible to dissuade these entities from acting since they have
nothing to lose and conceal the origin of their attacks."); see also Emanuel Gross, The Strug-
gle of a Democracy Against the Terror of Suicide Bombers: Ideological and Legal Aspects, 22
[Vol. 33:587
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Another concern that Waltz discounts is that states possessing nuclear
weapons could use them in an armed confrontation.4 6 This fear largely stems
from organizational tendencies within states, especially in the military. Mili-
tary officials tend to believe that war is inevitable and "display strong biases
in favor of offensive doctrines and decisive operations. '47 Military officers
are more likely to advocate the use of nuclear weapons, especially in the
case of preventive war.48 For example, during the Cold War, "preventive nu-
clear attacks were clearly imagined, actively planned, and vigorously
advocated by senior U.S. military leaders well beyond the initial develop-
ment and deployment of nuclear weapons by the USSR."'49 Current fears that
Israel is planning a preventive attack against Iran suggest that the fear of a
preventive nuclear strike has survived the Cold War.5 ) Moreover, a military
official in the highest positions of power in a nuclear weapons state, such as
Kim Jong Un, may be more inclined to authorize offensive nuclear war.
5 1
The second major criticism of Waltz's theory is that nuclear weapons
have not been as successful in deterring general warfare as he claims. The
presence of nuclear weapons in South Asia, for example, has arguably creat-
ed more instability in India-Pakistan relations.5 2 Possession of nuclear
Wis. INT'L L.J. 597, 638 (2004) (describing the indoctrination of a young man convinced to be
a terrorist).
46. GRAHAM ALLISON & PHILIP ZELIKOW, ESSENCE OF DECISION 361-62 (2d ed. 1999)
(describing how the Soviets' fear that Castro would utilize nuclear weapons during the Cuban
Missile Crisis was one of the major reasons for pulling weapons out of Cuba during the Mis-
sile Crisis).
47. SAGAN & WALTZ, supra note 25, at 55.
48. Id. at 56 ("During both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, senior U.S.
military officers seriously advocated preventive-war options and, in both cases, continued fa-
voring such ideas well after civilian leaders ruled against them.").
49. Id. at 60.
50. Rend Louis Beres, Israel, Iran and Preemption: Choosing the Least Unattractive
Option Under International Law, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 187, 197 n.43 (1996) (arguing that a
preemptive nuclear strike by Israel against Iran is unlikely, but possible); Behnam Gharagozli,
War of Words or a Regional Disaster? The (I)Legality of Israeli and Iranian Military Options,
33 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMp. L. REV. 203, 237-38 (2010) (describing the impetus behind and
the possibility of Israel launching an attack against Iran); Jeffrey Goldberg, The Point of No
Return, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 2010, at 56, 56, available at http://www.theatlantic.
com/magazine/archive/2010/09/the-point-of-no-return/8186/.
51. Michael A. Levi, Deterring Nuclear Terrorism, ISSUES SC. & TECH., Spring 2004,
at 70, 70 (2004) ("Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of
mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist
allies." (quoting President George W. Bush, President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at
West Point (June 1, 2002), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2002/06/2002060 l-3.html)).
52. GEORGE PERKOVICH ET AL., UNIVERSAL COMPLIANCE: A STRATEGY FOR NUCLEAR
SECURITY 15-16 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace ed., 2007), available at
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/univ comp-rpt07-finall.pdf; Kevin M. Brew, The Re-
Emergence of Nuclear Weapons as "The Coin of the Realm" and the Return of Nuclear
Brinkmanship in South Asia: The Nuclear Sword of Damocles Still Hangs by a Thread, 52
NAVAL L. REV. 177, 223 (2005) ("India operates on the assumption that Pakistan may use
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weapons has consistently promoted aggressive behavior by Pakistan toward
India.5 3 Although the presence of these weapons has shielded Pakistan from
an all-out conventional (or nuclear) response by India to this aggressive be-
havior, India has countered with aggressive tactics of its own, leading to
outcomes ranging from limited war to military mobilization.5 4 The most
pronounced of these interactions occurred in 1999 during the Kargil Inci-
dent when Pakistani forces, disguised as local militants, crossed the Line of
Control dividing India from Pakistani Kashmir.5 India responded with a
"spirited air and ground offensive to oust the intruders. '5 6 The result was
fighting at close quarters that led to over 1,000 military casualties.5 ' Nuclear
weapons allowed Pakistan to launch such an incursion, despite India's pos-
session of nuclear weapons, because the Pakistani government knew full
well that its nuclear capability discouraged a full-scale Indian retaliation.5
Rather than having a deterrent effect, the presence of nuclear weapons in
India and Pakistan's dispute over Kashmir has enabled Pakistan to take a
more aggressive and offensive posture. This result directly contradicts the
type of state behavior predicted by Waltz .Ultimately, this example suggests
that in some cases, nuclear weapons may enable and encourage offensive
behavior rather than prevent it altogether.
Beyond its effects on armed conflict, the existence of nuclear weapons
carries several other risks to global security. Inherent in a state possessing
nuclear weapons is the risk of an accidental launch or nuclear technology
reaching a rogue state or terrorist organization. 9 Nuclear weapons are not
nuclear weapons first .... But the nuclear policies do not complement each other and are in-
stead based on confusion, brinkmanship, and mistrust."); Myron A. Brilliant, Pakistan: A Test
Case for United States Nonproliferation Laws, 4 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 91, 129 (1989)
(predicting the regional instability that would result from Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear
weapons); S. Paul Kapur, Ten Years of Instability in Nuclear South Asia, INT'L SECURITY, Fall
2008, at 71, 72.
53. See Kapur, supra note 52, at 72.
54. Id.
55. C. Christine Fair, The Militant Challenge in Pakistan, 11 ASIA POL'Y 105, 119
(2011) ("In that limited conflict, often referred to as the 'Kargil conflict,' Pakistan employed
the Northern Light Infantry disguised as civilian irregular fighters.").
56. Kapur, supra note 52, at 73.
57. Id. at 73-74.
58. See id. at 75.
59. See Joseph Cirincione, Proliferation Threats and Solutions, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 339, 341 (2005) ("[T]he United States and Russia are still in a Cold War
nuclear posture .... This posture increases the chance of unauthorized launch, accidental
launch, or failure of the Russian early warning system."); James Fergusson, Thinking About a
Known Unknown: US Strategy and the Past, Present, and Future Implications of Strategic De-
fence, 63 INT'L J. 823, 831-32 (2008) ("No one knew what might happen if an accidental
launch resulted in the destruction of a city or two."); David S. Jonas & Christopher Swift, Re-
formulating the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Al-Qaeda, Global Terrorism and the Rogue
State Paradigm, 13 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 337, 338-44 (2008); Christopher C.
Joyner & Alexander Ian Parkhouse, Nuclear Terrorism in a Globalizing World: Assessing the
Threat and the Emerging Management Regime, 45 STAN. J. INT'L L. 203, 204-05 (2009)
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effective in deterring the actions of terrorist groups, who have no territory to
defend and are not accountable to any constituency for their actions. 6° Ulti-
mately, whatever deterrence value nuclear weapons possess is not enough to
justify opposition to the goal of complete disarmament. 61 The next Section
further outlines the risks of nuclear weapons.
B. Nuclear Weapons Pose a Unique and Devastating
Threat to Global Security
The last time a nuclear weapon was deliberately used in an attack was
over sixty years ago.61 Yet many countries still consider weapons of mass
destruction to be their top national security threat. 63 Beyond traditional mili-
tary uses, there are several methods by which a nuclear weapon could pose a
serious international security risk.
1. The Risk of a Terrorist Attack or Dirty Bomb
Governments and international agencies have acknowledged that nucle-
ar weapons pose a threat to global peace and prosperity. The National
(arguing that nuclear terrorism is emerging as one of the foremost threats to Western security);
David Krieger, What Happens If... ? Terrorists, Revolutionaries, and Nuclear Weapons, 430
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 44, 47 (1977) (describing how a state could be tempted
to sell a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group).
60. Rebecca Johnson, Politics and Protection: Why the 2005 NPT Review Conference
Failed, DISARMAMENT DIPL., Autumn 2005, available at http://www.acronym.org.uk/
dd/dd80/80npt.htm ("[T]he logic of nuclear deterrence, such as it was in the cold war, is worse
than irrelevant when faced with extreme ideologues.").
61. Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The New Bush National Security Doctrine and
the Rule of Law, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 375, 426 (2004) ("[Tlhe symmetry and deterrence
value of the threat of mutual destruction is largely illusory."); Douglas Triggs, Prospects for
Nuclear Proliferation and Its Control, 6 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 159, 170-71 (1976) (de-
scribing the deterrence value of nuclear weapons). But see Stephen J. Hadley, Policy
Considerations in Using Nuclear Weapons, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 23, 25-26 (1998).
62. See Nanda, supra note 22, at 337 (describing how the call for disarmament came
immediately after the bombs were dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima).
63. See, e.g., CABINET OFFICE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
KINGDOM: SECURITY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 11 (2008), available at
http://interactive cabinetoffice.gov. uk/docuinents/security/national security strategy.pdf
("Sixty years after their invention and almost 40 years after the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), nuclear weapons remain potentially the most destructive threat to global securi-
ty' ); GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, DRAFT REPORT OF
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD ON INDIAN NUCLEAR DOCTRINE (1999), available at
http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/nw7a.htm ("The use of nuclear weapons in particular as
well as other weapons of mass destruction constitutes the gravest threat to humanity and to
peace and stability in the international system."); INFO. OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF
CHINA, CHINA'S NATIONAL DEFENSE IN 2010 (2011) [hereinafter CHINA'S NATIONAL DE-
FENSE], available at http://www.china.org.cn/govemment/whitepaper/node_7114675.htm;
THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 8 (2010)
[hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/rss viewer/national-secuity-strategy.pdf.
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Security Strategy of the United States recognizes that "[t]errorists are de-
termined to buy, build, or steal a nuclear weapon."' China's 2010 White
Paper on national defense has an entire section dedicated to nuclear arms
control.65 The U.N. Security Council discusses the threats associated with
terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons in Resolution 1540 (on the
nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction) and reiterates its concerns
in Resolution 1887.66
Nonstate actors pose a different threat than state actors with respect to
nuclear weapons. 67 State actors are primarily concerned with their own
preservation, while some nonstate actors have ulterior motivations and may
not be as easy to deter with threats of destruction. 68 Suicide attacks, such as
the one orchestrated on September 11, 2001, suggest that some terrorist or-
ganizations are willing to sacrifice lives in order to accomplish their
objectives. 69 As a result, traditional deterrents against state action, such as
threats of economic sanctions or even military strikes, are rendered obsolete
against terrorist groups.70 Since some terrorist groups have already used bio-
logical weapons against individuals,71 it would not be surprising for a
terrorist group to use a nuclear weapon if it could gain access to one.7 2
64. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 63, at 23.
65. CHINA'S NATIONAL DEFENSE, supra note 63.
66. S.C. Res. 1540, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004); S.C. Res. 1887, su-
pro note 17, pmbl. ("Gravely concerned about the threat of nuclear terrorism, and recognizing
the need for all States to take effective measures to prevent nuclear material or technical assis-
tance becoming available to terrorists .... ").
67. See JEFFREY BOUTWELL ET AL., PUGWASH CONFS. ON SCI. & WORLD AFF., NUCLE-
AR TERRORISM: THE DANGER OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) 2 (2 Pugwash Issue
Brief, 2002), available at http://www.pugwash.org/publication/pb/sept2002.pdf (highlighting
the tremendous reciprocal consequences that would arise if a terrorist group were to utilize a
nuclear weapon).
68. Jonas & Swift, supra note 59, at 338; see W. RAYMOND DUNCAN ET AL., WORLD
POLITICS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 92 (2009) ("The other non-state actors are different. Drug and
terrorist groups have their own violent agendas and operate in a shadowy world that is difficult
for states to penetrate but whose actions serve to expose the state's vulnerable underside.").
69. Martha Crenshaw, The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century,
21 POL. PSYCHOL. 405, 411 (2000) ("Thus the 'new' terrorists seek to cause high numbers of
casualties and are willing to commit suicide or use weapons of mass destruction in order to do
so.").
70. See RECORD, supra note 28, at 3; David Cole, Less Safe, Less Free: A Progress Re-
port on the War on Terror, 8 J. INST. JUST & INT'L STUD. 1, 1 (2008) (describing the Bush
administration policy regarding terrorist actions, which was focused on prevention, not deter-
rence); Amitai Etzioni, Terrorists: A Distinct Species, 23 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 1, 5
(2011) (describing why terrorists have to be treated differently than common criminals).
71. Chesney, supra note 37, at 33-34 (describing the sarin nerve gas attacks of the Aum
Shinrikyo religious cult on Matsumoto City and Tokyo, Japan).
72. Jonas & Swift, supra note 59, at 343.
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Although states have institutional safeguards to prevent such a situa-
tion,73 terrorists could exploit any holes or weaknesses in their security
systems. Nuclear weapons are expensive to maintain, as they must be con-
stantly monitored to prevent against accident, theft, or attack.74 Moreover,
with vast amounts of weapons and the poor security protecting some of the
weapons, the international community has reason to be wary.75 These weap-
ons are subject to security threats on multiple fronts. Stealing a nuclear
weapon is the most likely method by which a terrorist group or rogue state
could obtain a nuclear weapon.76 In Pakistan, however, terrorists have taken
a more direct approach and launched direct attacks on nuclear weapon fa-
cilities with the intent of causing massive damage.
77
A terrorist organization or rogue state could also obtain either a nuclear
bomb or highly enriched uranium (a key ingredient in making such a bomb)
from the black market. 71 Cross border trade for such material does exist,
largely because the heightened interdependence of the global economy has
73. Vikram Jagadish, Pakistan's Ultimate Nightmare Scenario: Preventing Islamic
Extremists from Acquiring Nuclear Weapons, 13 TEx. REv. L. & POL. 223, 230-32 (2009) (de-
scribing Pakistan's nuclear plants' protections against terrorist theft).
74. See Stephen I. Schwartz & Deepti Choubey, Op-Ed., The Cost of Nuclear Security,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2009, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-
schwartz12-2009jan12,0,5207429.story (finding that the United States spent at least $52
billion on nuclear-weapons-related programs in fiscal year 2008); see also David Silverberg,
America's Nuclear Arsenal: $5.5 Trillion Well-Spent, HILL, July 8, 1998 (describing a Brook-
ings Institute study that documented the "cost of research and development, production,
deployment, delivery systems, infrastructure, storage and cleanup").
75. See U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6191st mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6191 (Sept. 24,
2009) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. S/PV.6191] (comments of U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki
Moon); Chesney, supra note 37, at 82; Kevin Jon Heller, Guest-Post: Nuclear Trafficking as
an International Crime?, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 4, 2011, 12:24 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/201 1/
04/04/guest-post-nuclear-trafficking-as-an-international-crime/ (describing the inability of the
current international regulatory regime to prevent the sale and/or smuggling of nuclear weap-
ons and suggesting that nuclear trafficking should be made into an international crime).
76. See Kraska, supra note 37, at 730-32 (highlighting fears of nuclear weapon theft in
both Russia and Pakistan); Winston P. Nagan & Erin K. Slemmens, Developing U.S. Nuclear
Weapons Policy and International Law: The Approach of the Obama Administration, 19 TUL.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 41, 44 n.9 (2010) (quoting NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note
63, at 23, regarding the idea that terrorists are determined to steal a nuclear weapon); Travis
Sharp & Erica Poff, Understanding and Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, CTR. FOR ARMS
CONTROL & NON-PROLIFERATION (Dec. 3, 2008), http://armscontrolcenter.org/policy/
nuclearterrorismlarticles/ 111408_understanding-preventing-nuclearjterrorism ("[T]he great-
est threat today is that a non-state actor will steal a nuclear weapon or the fissile materials
needed to make one.").
77. Report: Pakistan Nuclear Facilities Attacked at Least Three Times by Terrorists,
FOXNEWS.cOM, Aug. 11, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,538904,00.html; see
also RAJESH M. BASRUR & HASAN-ASKARI RIzvI, SANDIA NAT'L LABS., NUCLEAR TERRORISM
AND SOUTH ASIA 20 (Coop. Monitoring Ctr. Occasional Paper/25, 2003), available at
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/bdrc/nuclear/terrorism/SAND98-050525.pdf ("Terrorists might be
able to steal or, more likely, use force to acquire a nuclear weapon.").
78. See Joyner & Parkhouse, supra note 59, at 218-19.
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opened up trade networks facilitating such exchanges. 79 The opening up of
borders for greater international trade has "resulted in the progressive com-
moditization of WMDs."8 ° Therefore, "rogue states and even advanced
terrorist syndicates can now purchase key materials and components 'i la
carte from dispersed, disconnected, and even completely unrelated suppli-
ers."'" Much of this material comes from the poorly secured nuclear
stockpiles found in the states of the former Soviet Union. 2 The technical in-
formation needed to build a nuclear bomb is also widely available.83 The
demand gives nuclear insiders an incentive to put nuclear material and in-
formation on the black market in order to profit.84 With the know-how and
materials necessary to build a nuclear bomb available through decentralized,
often clandestine sources, the possibility of a terrorist group building a nu-
clear weapon exists, although it is far less likely to happen than terrorists
simply stealing a weapon from a nuclear weapons stateY Given this very
real threat, the global community would be wise to heed the advice of for-
mer U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry, who stated that "fewer
weapons of mass destruction in fewer hands makes ... the world safer."86
If a terrorist group acquires a nuclear weapon, the group could use it to
gain political power, influence international policy, or commit a heinous act
of violence.87 Moreover, once a terrorist group has obtained a nuclear weap-
on it will be difficult to prevent the group from detonating it because of the
lack of deterrents discussed above. 8 Not only would complete disarmament
eliminate the risk of nuclear weapons being stolen by a rogue state or terror-
79. See Jonas & Swift, supra note 59, at 341.
80. Id. at 356.
81. Id.
82. Chesney, supra note 37, at 44-45.
83. Id. at 36.
84. Id. at 41-45 (arguing that a nuclear black market could be a large threat to national
security); Jagadish, supra note 73, at 235 (highlighting the threat of Pakistani officials selling
a nuclear weapon to terrorists in order to pay off debts); Jonas & Swift, supra note 59, at 358;
Ian Traynor & Ian Cobain, Intelligence Report Claims Nuclear Market Thriving, GUARDIAN,
Jan. 4, 2006, at 6 (describing, in depth, the network of engineering finns, middlemen, stu-
dents, and front companies that are involved in securing nuclear material for Pakistan, Iran,
and Syria).
85. See Frank Barnaby, The Risk of Nuclear Terrorism, in SECURE ENERGY? CIVIL Nu-
CLEAR POWER, SECURITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE 24, 25-26 (Frank Bamaby & Jack Kemp
eds., 2007) [hereinafter SECURE ENERGY?], available at http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.
org.uk/sites/default/files/secureenergy.pdf (arguing that terrorists would have the capability to
build a nuclear weapon from enriched uranium alone); BOUTWELL ET AL., supra note 67, at
3-4 (arguing that terrorists could use highly enriched uranium to create a weapon); Uzi
Mahnaimi & Tom Walker, Al-Qaeda Woos Recruits with Nuclear Bomb Website, SUNDAY
TIMES (London), Nov. 6, 2005, at 25 (describing a manual produced by Al Qaeda that details
methods for making small-scale nuclear weapons).
86. Chesney, supra note 37, at 33.
87. Jonas & Swift, supra note 59, at 361.
88. Chesney, supra note 37, at 35-36 (preventing an attack on the back end is fruitless).
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ist group, but it would also limit the opportunities for terrorists to obtain the
materials necessary to manufacture a nuclear weapon.8 9
2. The Dangers of Nuclear Proliferation
Beyond the threat of a terrorist attack, the proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons to other state actors poses additional threats to global security. Since
states keep their nuclear programs relatively concealed, it is difficult for the
international community to assess the real safety risks associated with pro-
liferation.9" As discussed above, while it seems unlikely that one nation will
actively launch an unprovoked nuclear attack upon another state,91 holding
nuclear weapons could cause a state to act more aggressively in its relation-
ships with others. 92 Past experience also suggests that the possibility of an
accidental launch is not necessarily remote.93 Finally, as long as states
possess these weapons, there will always be a danger that they will be used
deliberately for military purposes.
94
Furthermore, proliferation is a self-reinforcing problem: the mere pres-
ence of nuclear weapons encourages other states to obtain them, thereby
exacerbating the risks discussed in this Section. Frank Charles Barnaby, a
Nuclear Issues Consultant to the Oxford Research Group, highlights four
89. Thomas Graham, Jr., Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Terrorism, 17 TRANS-
NAT'L LAW. 89, 94 (2004) (arguing that reducing stockpiles and fissile material is the most
effective method for preventing a nuclear attack by terrorists); Alyn Ware, Nuclear Prolifera-
tion: Rule of Force or Rule of Law? Legal Responses to Nuclear Threats from Terrorism,
Proliferation, and War, 2 SEATTLE J. Soc. JUST. 243, 250 (2003) (stating that "disarmament
and international control of fissile materials" is the only solution for disarmament).
90. Sergio Duarte, Nuclear Weapons and the Rule of Law, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 573,
576 (2010); Jagadish, supra note 73, at 226 (describing Pakistan's stockpile of weapons and
how little is known about it); David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, Iran Says It Will Speed Up
Uranium Enrichment, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2011, at A14 (describing the uncertainty surround-
ing Iran's nuclear program and the accelerated efforts of Iran in seeking nuclear technology).
91. See supra Part L.A (discussing nuclear deterrence). But see Michael J. Matheson,
The Opinions of the International Court of Justice on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
91 AM. J. INT'L L. 417, 431 (1997) (arguing that unless nations are actually willing to fire, the
policy of deterrence makes no sense).
92. See George Jahn, IAEA: Syria Very Likely Hid Nuke Program, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
May 24, 2011 (describing a bombing by Israel-a nuclear weapons state--of a Syrian target
believed to be a nuclear reactor site).
93. SAGAN & WALTZ, supra note 25, at 75 (stating that there were far more "near-
accidents than previously recognized" between the United States and Soviet Union during the
Cold War).
94. David A. Koplow & Philip G. Schrag, Carrying a Big Carrot: Linking Multilateral
Disarmament and Development Assistance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 993, 996 (1991) ("[T]he dan-
ger of a nuclear war initiated between the superpowers will linger for as long as such weapons
remain in their arsenals."); see Robert S. Norris & Hans M. Kristensen, Global Nuclear Stock-
piles, 1945-2002, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Nov./Dec. 2002, at 103, 103-04, available at
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/58/6/103.full.pdf.
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reasons why a state might seek nuclear weapons: 95 1) deterrence,96 2) pres-
tige,97 3) domestic power,98 and 4) the domino effect. 99 Moreover, the
asymmetry of power between nuclear-weapons states (NWS) and non-
nuclear-weapons states (NNWS) causes insecurity.00 This makes it more
likely that NNWS will eventually seek to obtain nuclear weapons.' 0' With
more nations in possession of nuclear weapons, it becomes increasingly dif-
ficult for international regulation to play an effective role in maintaining
security. 102
95. Frank Barnaby, From Civil Nuclear Means to Military Ends: Iran, a Case Study, in
SECURE ENERGY?, supra note 85, at 32, 32.
96. Mark Helprin, Op., Why Israel Needs the Bomb, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2010, at A 19
(describing how Israel requires a nuclear weapon to keep its enemies in the Middle East at
bay).
97. E.g., Weixing Hu, New Delhi's Nuclear Bomb: A Systemic Analysis, 163 WORLD
AFF. 28, 28-29 (2000) (describing global status as a major impetus behind India's quest for
nuclear weapons); Jonas & Swift, supra note 59, at 361 (noting that nuclear weapons "pro-
duce reputational effects, enhancing the credibility and standing of a terrorist syndicate among
potential followers and allies"); Chris Peloso, Crafting an Updated Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty: Applying the Lessons Learned from the Success of Similar International Treaties to the
Nuclear Arms Problem, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 309, 323 (2011) ("Similarly, North Korea
developed nuclear weapons so as to be taken seriously as a country and to serve as a deterrent
against perceived American aggression."); see Amir Azaran, NPT Where Art Thou? The Non-
proliferation Treaty and Bargaining: Iran as a Case Study, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 415, 421 (2005)
("[S]ome view the NPT not as a global effort to halt the spread of nuclear weapons for the
good of humanity, but as a tool of the nuclear 'haves' to maintain their monopoly on nuclear
weapons."); Amalendd Misra, India at 50: Democracy, Nationalism and Foreign Policy
Choices, 30 ASIAN AVE. 45, 53 (1999) (creating a nuclear weapon is partially for military pur-
poses and partially to gain a level of international status and recognition); Sagan et al., supra
note 23, at 137.
98. See, e.g., Misra, supra note 97, at 53 (discussing nuclear tests in India and the Bha-
ratiya Janata Party's "conscious effort to associate populism with its foreign and defense
policies"); Michael J. Garcia, Note, A Necessary Response: The Lack of Domestic and Inter-
national Constraints upon a U.S. Nuclear Response to a Terrorist Attack, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 515, 552 (2003) ("In the United States, the power to use nuclear weapons belongs to
the President and, during times of conflict, Congress is unlikely to limit his discretion because
of constitutional and political restraints.").
99. Ashton B. Carter, New Approaches for Addressing the Threat of WMD Prolifera-
tion, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. (SPECIAL EDITION), Fall 2006, at 113, 114 (describing the fear,
in 1994, that the North Koreans' acquisition of nuclear weapons would lead to other East
Asian nations seeking to acquire weapons as well).
100. John Gorham Palfrey, Nuclear Exports and Nonproliferation Strategy, in THE NU-
CLEAR POWER CONTROVERSY 129, 133-34 (Arthur W. Murphy ed., 1976) (stating that the
NPT creates a strong asymmetry between nuclear-weapons states and non-nuclear-weapons
states).
101. See PERKOVICH ET AL., supra note 52, at 16; John Simpson, The Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Regime: Back to the Future?, DISARMAMENT F., no. 1, 2004, at 5, available at
http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-art2Ol5.pdf (arguing that the lack of counterbalancing of
nuclear states such as the United States has fueled a new wave of proliferation).
102. See PERKOVICH ET AL., supra note 52, at 14; Mark T. Clark, Law upon Order, 40
BRANDEIS L.J. 759, 770 (2001) ("[A]s more states acquire nuclear weapons, there will develop
a greater probability of irrational choices in the future."); Jonas, supra note 11, at 438 ("As
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II. THE FAILURES OF THE NPT REGIME-MUTUAL DISTRUST
Many scholars have argued that the NPT and the current regulatory re-
gime have done a tremendous job of limiting the proliferation of weapons
and working towards disarmament. 103 However, the existing regime was de-
signed with the Cold War in mind. Thus, it fails to properly address the
modem threats associated with rogue states and nonstate actors such as ter-
rorist organizations.' 4 Attempts to improve the regime through NPT
renewal conferences have failed, largely because of lack of trust between
NWS and NNWS. 1°5 Moreover, the commitment to disarmament found in
the regime has proven to be a hollow one among the participants. 0 6 Finally,
the regime has failed in perhaps its most important role--enforcement of its
provisions. 107 Until there is wholesale reform of the NPT, these same prob-
lems will continue to plague this cornerstone of the nuclear weapons
regulatory regime.' To understand why this is the case, it is necessary to
analyze the NPT, specifically its origins and its failures.
more states acquire nuclear weapons, and nuclear weapons proliferate, the risk of nuclear
weapon-use increases and NPT relevance decreases."); W. Michael Reisman, Holding the
Center of the Law of Armed Conflict, 100 Am. J. INT'L L. 852, 859 (2006) ("The more states
acquire nuclear weapons, the greater the likelihood of still further proliferation and nuclear
wars-and nuclear terrorist actions ....").
103. Graham, supra note 89, at 90 (describing how the NPT shifted an act of national
pride-creating a nuclear weapon-into an act of international condemnation); David A.
Koplow, Parsing Good Faith: Has the United States Violated Article VI of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty?, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 301, 311 (1993) (highlighting the successes of the
regime).
104. Koplow, supra note 103, at 381; Jonas & Swift, supra note 59, at 340-42; see also
Condoleezza Rice, Promoting the National Interest, FOREIGN AVF., Jan./Feb. 2000, at 45, 61
(criticizing the NPT for being wrapped up in an antiquated adversarial relationship between
the United States and Russia and explaining that the United States has not ratified the Com-
prehensive Test Ban Treaty partially because of lack of verifiability); Alastair Crooke, Defend
the NPT: The US and Europe Are Trampling over Iran's Right to Enrich Uranium, PROSPECT
MAG., June 2006, available at http://conflictsforum.org/2006/defend-the-npt/ ("We should lift
our eyes from this arcane long-term US debate on deterrence-fashioned largely by cold war
specialists.").
105. See Martha Finnemore, Fights About Rules: The Role of Efficacy and Power in
Changing Multilateralism, 31 REV. INT'L STUD. 187, 193 (2005) (describing the mutual dis-
trust and resentment between the nuclear "haves" and "have-nots" that plagued the NPT
renewal conference of 2005); Johnson, supra note 60 (discussing how "Iran's intentions to en-
rich uranium ... [have] divided the NPT regime between those who want limits to be placed
on the nuclear fuel cycle and those who believe the curbs should be placed on 'states of con-
cern'" instead).
106. Patricia Hewitson, Nonproliferation and Reduction of Nuclear Weapons: Risks of
Weakening the Multilateral Nuclear Nonproliferation Norm, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 405,
461-62 (2003) (describing how the United States has often flouted the NPT's requirement to
disarm).
107. Jonas & Swift, supra note 59, at 349-50 (arguing that the major failures of the NPT
are its nonbinding nature and its lack of enforcement capabilities).
108. Jack I. Garvey, A New Architecture for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
12 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 339, 341-43 (2008). But see Kanwar, supra note 16, at 192-93
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A. The History of the NPT
The NPT was designed as a bulwark against the proliferation of nuclear
weapons.' 09 The impetus for the treaty came from countries outside the
United States' and Soviet Union's nuclear umbrellas." 0 Moreover, the Unit-
ed States and the Soviet Union sought to put a "halt" to the nuclear arms
race,"' specifically to prevent Japan and developed European powers (ex-
cept France and the United Kingdom) from "feeling the need to build up
their own nuclear arsenals.""' 2 Proliferation was the subject of "intensive
discussion and negotiation in the U.N.-sponsored Eighteen Nation Commit-
tee on Disarmament (ENDC)" in 1968." 3 "[E]ight non-aligned members of
the ENDC-Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and
the United Arab Republic (Egypt)-proposed a resolution calling for a trea-
ty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons."' 14 This resolution advanced
five principles, including preventing NNWS from developing nuclear weap-
ons and taking steps toward the achievement of a "general and complete...
nuclear disarmament.""l 5 While nonproliferation and disarmament were the
principal concerns of the nonnuclear states negotiating the treaty, these
states also sought increased assistance for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.16
This concern, though, was "secondary.""'  After much debate and
compromise, the NPT was formally opened for signature on July 1, 1968,
and entered into force on March 5, 1970.118
The NPT divides the world into NWS and NNWS and places dueling
obligations on both parties. NWS-Russia, the United States, France, the
United Kingdom, and China-undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons to
NNWS and not to "assist, encourage, or induce" NNWS to develop their
own nuclear weapons.1" 9 NNWS agree to refuse any such transfers and "not
to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear ex-
(arguing that future nonproliferation regulation must harmonize with past treaties and regula-
tions).
109. NPT, supra note 12, pmbl. ("[T]he proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously
enhance the danger of nuclear war... ").
110. Epstein & Szasz, supra note 10, at 739-40.
Ill. Id. at 740; see also DAVID B. THOMSON, A GUIDE TO THE NUCLEAR ARMS CON-
TROL TREATIES 79-81 (2001).
112. ROBERT F. MOZLEY, THE POLITICS AND TECHNOLOGY OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
147-48 (1998).
113. Epstein & Szasz, supra note 10, at 736.
114. Id. at 738-39.
115. Harold Ullman, Strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: A Draft Con-
vention, 26 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 167, 170-71 n.17 (1988) (describing the five
principles).
116. Epstein & Szasz, supra note 10, at 740-41.
117. Id. at 741.
118. Id. at 736.
119. NPT, supra note 12, art. 1.
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plosive devices." ' ° The NPT also authorizes the International Atomic Ener-
gy Agency (IAEA) to monitor the "flow of all nuclear material in a
country."12' NNWS are required, within two years of ratifying the NPT, to
negotiate a detailed agreement establishing an accounting system for their
nuclear material.1 22 Yet no complimentary obligation is placed on NWS.
123
The agreement also determines "the process and scope of [IAEA] inspec-
tions."1 24 If NNWS violate the agreement, the IAEA can refer the matter to
the U.N. Security Council, which can determine how to proceed. 125 If a na-
tion is in violation of the NPT, the only action that can be taken is to report
the state to the U.N. Security Council.
1 2 6
The "grand bargain" of the NPT is that in exchange for NNWS forgoing
their pursuit of nuclear weapons, NWS will move towards disarmament. 12 7
The NPT has several provisions aimed at nuclear disarmament. The pream-
ble states that signatories to the NPT "declar[e] their intention to achieve at
the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to under-
take effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament."'128 Article
VI of the treaty states that "[e]ach of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to
pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation
of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on
a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective in-
ternational control."' 29 NPT parties hoped that future renegotiations of the
120. Id. art. II.
121. MozLEY, supra note 112, at 144.
122. Azaran, supra note 97, at 419-20.
123. Priya Pillai, Opening Pandora's Box: A New Era for Nuclear Weapon Proliferation,
in 2 INDIA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 99, 101-02 (Bimal N. Patel ed., 2008) (describing the
divergent obligations of NNWS and NWS and identifying one of the obligations of a NNWS
as signing an individual safeguard agreement within two years of ratifying the NPT).
124. Azaran, supra note 97, at 419-20; see also David Sloss, It's Not Broken, So Don't
Fix It: The International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards System and the Nuclear Nonpro-
liferation Treaty, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 841, 854 (1995).
125. Azaran, supra note 97, at 419.
126. See Sloss, supra note 124, at 890-91.
127. Jonathan Marcus, An Old Treaty for a New World?, BBC NEws (May 2, 2005, 3:35
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/450451 l.stm ("At the heart of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty's success lies a 'grand bargain'.. .. [A]s part of the 'grand bargain,' the five declared
nuclear powers undertook eventually to give up their nuclear arms."); see U.S. President
Barack Obama, Remarks on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament at Hradany Square,
Prague, Czech Republic (Apr. 5, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered ("The basic bar-
gain is sound: Countries with nuclear weapons will move towards disarmament, countries
without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and all countries can access peaceful nuclear
energy.").
128. NPT, supra note 12, pmbl.
129. Id. art. VI.
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NPT would lead to further developments towards disarmament. 130 Unfortu-
nately, this has not proven to be the case.
Since its inception, the NPT has become the cornerstone of global ef-
forts to confront nuclear proliferation.' 3 ' Therefore, the successes and
failures of efforts to curb nuclear proliferation are largely the result of the
NPT. One hundred eighty-nine nations have signed on to the treaty.'32 Its
near-universal acceptance is considered a major benefit of keeping the trea-
ty.'33 In 1995, the signatories to the treaty approved its indefinite renewal. 13 4
The NPT, however, has a mixed track record in achieving its dual goals of
nonproliferation and disarmament.
B. An Assessment of the NPT Regime
The NPT's goal of nonproliferation has been relatively successful: on-
ly four new states have joined the nuclear weapons club. India, Israel,
Pakistan, and North Korea are all states that have built nuclear weapons
since the treaty's inception, and all have yet to sign the treaty or have
withdrawn from it.'13 As a result of being NNWS in 1970, however, these
states cannot rejoin the treaty until, and unless, they have eliminated all
their nuclear weapons.136 The addition of only four new nuclear states to
the international nuclear order could be considered a victory.'3 7 However,
130. Koplow, supra note 103, at 339 ("The NPT was widely seen as a temporary expedi-
ent, to deal with the emergency of nuclear proliferation by freezing the status quo, to preclude
further deterioration of the global security situation, in anticipation of a later and better resolu-
tion.").
131. Id. at 308 n.20; Jonas, supra note 11, at 418 n. 1.
132. Essoh J.M.C. Essis, From Individual State Preferences to Collective Decisions: An
Analytic Account of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, 10 INT' L NEGOTIATION
513, 537 (2005).
133. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 7, at 489-90, 490 n.8; Jonas & Swift, supra note 59, at
347-49.
134. Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Apr. 17-May 12, 1995, Decisions and Resolution Adopted
at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, Dec. 3, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF. 1995/32
(Part I), Annex, available at http://www.un.org/disarmament[WMD/Nuclear/1995-NPT/pdf/
NPTCONF199503.pdf ("[The Conference] [d]ecides that, as a majority exists among States
party to the Treaty for its indefinite extension, in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, the
Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely."); Azaran, supra note 97, at 418; see also Epstein &
Szasz, supra note 10, at 756-57 (arguing that throughout the history of the NPT, the NNWS
have been hesitant to endorse an indefinite extension of the treaty since it failed to provide
concrete disarmament provisions).
135. See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 7, at 490 & n.8 (2009). But see Ware, supra note 89,
at 248.
136. Assia Dosseva, Recent Developments, North Korea and the Non-Proliferation Trea-
ty, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 265, 267-68 (2006); Johnson, supra note 60 ("Recognizing that the
Treaty could not be re-opened to admit any additional nuclear weapon states as such .... ").
137. Hewitson, supra note 106, at 406; Kraska, supra note 37, at 767 (describing opti-
mism for the future since fewer countries are interested in nuclear weapons now than in the
past).
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the NPT is likely not entirely responsible for containing proliferation. The
bipolar world order created by the Cold War between the United States
and the Soviet Union constrained proliferation' 38 because many states fell
under the respective U.S. or Soviet nuclear umbrellas, reducing their in-
centives to pursue domestic production of nuclear weapons. 139 With these
arrangements terminating at the end of the Cold War, states had to fend for
their own security in the international community, giving them a greater
incentive to pursue nuclear weapons. 140 Therefore, as the international or-
der continues to adjust in the post-Cold War era, there will be more
pressure upon the NPT and the international nonproliferation regulatory
regime.141
The NPT has also largely failed in persuading NWS to disarm. 42 The
NPT does not by itself require NWS to achieve complete nuclear dis-
armament; rather, the NPT member states commit to "pursue negotiations
in good faith on effective measures" toward the goal of disarmament.
43
Moreover, the text does not obligate any of the parties to even take affirm-
ative steps toward disarmament.'" The only real movement towards
disarmament has occurred largely outside the framework of the NPT. As a
result of the bilateral Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START), signed
outside the NPT framework, Russia and the United States have reduced
their weapons stockpiles since the Cold War.'45 Moreover, states have
138. Douglas Hurd et al., Start Worrying and Learn to Ditch the Bomb, TIMES (London),
June 30, 2008, at 26 ("During the Cold War nuclear weapons had the perverse effect of mak-
ing the world a relatively stable place. That is no longer the case.").
139. Azaran, supra note 97, at 421 (citing George Rathjens, Nuclear Proliferation Fol-
lowing the NPT Extension, in THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME: PROSPECTS FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY 25, 26-27 (Raju G.C. Thomas ed., 1997)).
140. Garvey, supra note 108, at 353-54 (discussing the false concept of sovereign equal-
ity under the NPT regime); see RECORD, supra note 28, at 6; see also, e.g., HOOMAN PEIMANI,
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT: THE SELF-EXHAUSTING "SUPER-
POWERS" AND EMERGING ALLIANCES 7-9 (2000) (describing how following the Cold War,
India's nuclear program was pursued strictly for military objectives, which led to Pakistan
pursuing a nuclear weapon in order to "catch up with India").
141. See Azaran, supra note 97, at 422.
142. See Simpson, supra note 101, at 12-13 (showing that under the NPT, disarmament
fell into the shadows of the movement for nonproliferation).
143. Scott D. Sagan, Good Faith and Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations, in ABOLISH-
ING NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A DEBATE 203, 203 (George Perkovich & James M. Acton eds.,
2009) (quoting NPT, supra note 12, art. VI); see also E. Nwogugu, 1995 NPT Review and Ex-
tension Conference: An Appraisal, 3 AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 257, 273 (1995).
144. See Arsalan M. Suleman, Bargaining in the Shadow of Violence: The NPT IAEA,
and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Negotiations, 26 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 206, 227 (2008)
("There is, however, no institution or implementation mechanism that is tasked with ensuring
that the NPT's disarmament goal is pursued.").
145. See Christopher A. Ford, The Nonproliferation Bestiary: A Typology and Analysis of
Nonproliferation Regimes, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 937, 963-66 (2007). See generally
Treaty with Russia on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
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taken unilateral action to reduce their nuclear stockpiles without reference
to the NPT.14
6
In addition, the NPT suffers from a host of other problems. States have
little incentive to remain in the regime as they face only "limited penalties"
for withdrawing.147 Article X of the NPT allows a state to exit the NPT on
three months' notice to the other parties when "extraordinary events" jeop-
ardize that state's "supreme interests."'148 The ease of withdrawing from the
NPT creates another perverse incentive. Namely, states can reach the
"brink" of nuclear capability within the framework of the NPT and then
simply withdraw using the Article X exit provision. 149 North Korea took this
course of action in 1993.15°
Ultimately, the failures of the NPT can be traced back to the asymmetric
structure it codifies.' 5' The "grand bargain" has led to distrust between
states, making it difficult for NNWS to take the regime seriously.5 2 NNWS
view the NPT as a codification of the nuclear monopoly that NWS have ex-
ercised over them.'53 If the NPT maintains this relationship, NWS have little
incentive to disarm and NNWS, realizing this reality, have little incentive to
Arms, U.S.-Russ., Apr. 8, 2010, S. TREATY Doc. No. 1 11-5 [hereinafter START Treaty] (re-
placing the prior treaty, which expired in 2009).
146. See Christopher A. Ford, A New Paradigm: Shattering Obsolete Thinking on Arms
Control and Nonproliferation, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Nov. 2008, at 12, 13, available at
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008-l l/ford (describing how the United States cut its stock-
pile in half between 2004 and 2007).
147. See, e.g., Hewitson, supra note 106, at 433 (discussing the consequences of North
Korea's withdrawal from the treaty in 2003); Jonas & Swift, supra note 59, at 349-50 ("[T]he
regime is not universally binding and there are limited penalties for withdrawal."); Suleman,
supra note 144, at 247.
148. NPT, supra note 12, art. X(l).
149. Azaran, supra note 97, at 420.
150. PIERRE GOLDSCHMIDT, THE URGENT NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE NUCLEAR NON-
PROLIFERATION REGIME 3 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace ed., 2006), available at
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/6606.pdf; see also Matthias Dembin-
ski, North Korea, IAEA Special Inspections, and the Future of the Nonproliferation Regime,
NONPROLIFERATION REV., Winter 1995, at 31, 34.
151. See PERKOVICH ET AL., supra note 52, at 16; Mohamed ElBaradei, Towards a Safer
World, ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 2003, http://www.economist.com/node/2137602 (describing the
insecurity that the asymmetry breeds and how the asymmetry was only meant to be temporary
as NWS were set to move towards disarmament).
152. Joanne Finegan, Policy, Proliferation and the NPT: U.S. Strategies and South Asian
Prospects, 1980 OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS SER. CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD. 1, II (1980)
(describing India's claims that the NWS had an unfounded mistrust of NNWS); Thomas
Roser, Nuclear Energy and International Relations: The Case for the Federal Republic of
Germany, 73 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 166, 173 (1979) (describing a period of distrust and
unease that has existed in global politics since the passage of the NPT).
153. Epstein & Szasz, supra note 10, at 738 (describing how from the outset the NNWS
felt that they were discriminated against); Koplow, supra note 103, at 310, 336 (clarifying that
the NPT itself creates an asymmetric relationship).
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take the NPT seriously.'54 It is this mutual distrust that limits the effective-
ness of the NPT regime.' 55
Resolution 1887 states that, "the NPT remains the cornerstone of the
nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit
of nuclear disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy."'15 6 But
the world cannot move towards disarmament as long as the international
regulatory regime continues to rely on the broken bargain of the NPT. 157 The
post-Cold War order requires a more complete framework-one that focuses
on disarmament for all states and deals with nonstate security threats, rather
than creating divergent obligations and mistrust among signatories.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF RESOLUTION 1887-
THE CALL FOR DISARMAMENT
Although calls for disarmament came as early as 1945, after the first
nuclear weapon was used in World War II, disarmament has only recently
come to the forefront of international policy on nuclear weapons.55 The NPT
commits parties to the concept of nuclear disarmament in Article VI, but this
has proven to be an empty promise. 59 Past U.N. General Assembly Resolu-
tions have advocated for disarmament but have failed to attach any
requirements to their calls. 6 ° These calls for disarmament are not binding un-
der international law. In 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found
that the threat or use of nuclear weapons was not illegal under international
law in extreme circumstances.' 6 ' There is neither binding international law
154. PERKOVICH ET AL., supra note 52, at 16 (noting that the NNWS' conviction that the
nuclear states will not disarm has eroded their willingness to comply with the NPT); Hewit-
son, supra note 106, at 493-94.
155. See, e.g., Suleman, supra note 144, at 248-49 (highlighting the example of Iran to
indicate the shortcomings of the "grand bargain").
156. S.C. Res. 1887, supra note 17, pmbl.
157. See Nanda, supra note 22, at 347 (advocating for a nuclear weapons convention to
supplement the failed NPT regime).
158. Richard A. Falk, Nuclear Weapons, International Law and the World Court: A His-
toric Encounter, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 64, 64, 66 (1997); see also Baird, supra note 7, at 532-33
(highlighting the Baruch plan, which was proposed immediately following World War II and
sought to ensure that the United States would be the only party to ever possess nuclear weap-
ons).
159. See Orde F. Kittrie, How Can the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime Be Repaired?
What IfIt Can't?, 101 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 433, 439 (2007).
160. See, e.g., Women, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, G.A. Res.
65/69, U.N. Doc. AIRES/65/69 (Jan. 13, 2011); General and Complete Disarmament, G.A.
Res. 3261 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3261(XXIX) (Dec. 9, 1974); Prevention of the Wider
Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons, G.A. Res. 1380 (X1V), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1380(XIV)
(Nov. 20, 1959).
161. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, 105 (July 8); Matheson, supra note 91, at 430 (pointing to the difficulty in trying to de-
cipher what the court's holding means because nuclear arsenals were only meant to be used in
extreme circumstances).
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nor customary opinio juris to justify an absolute bar on use of nuclear
weapons.' 62 Thus, under international law it is legal to possess and utilize
nuclear weapons. 163
Resolution 1887 was drafted as a result of a push by the United States
to shift the perspective of the international nuclear regulatory regime. In
April 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama gave a speech in Prague envision-
ing a world free of nuclear weapons."6 The President's speech outlined a
number of concrete steps that could be taken towards this goal, including
reducing the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategy, instituting
a global ban on nuclear testing, and ending the production of materials that
are essential for creating a bomb (fissile material).'65 On September 24,
2009, President Obama chaired a heads-of-state-level U.N. Security Council
meeting, 66 and the dialogue from the meeting suggested a renewed, collec-
tive commitment toward promoting global disarmament. 67 This meeting
provided the impetus for Resolution 1887.
Resolution 1887 breaks from its predecessors by seeking to regulate all
states rather than simply rogue nations and NNWS.'6 8 Traditionally, calls for
disarmament have come from NNWS or have been empty claims of individ-
ual NWS leaders. 69 Resolution 1887 united both NWS and NNWS in the
pursuit of disarmament. 70 Thus, Resolution 1887 represents a collective
agreement by the world's most powerful nations to destroy weapons caches
around the world and "to create the conditions for a world without nuclear
weapons."'171
Ultimately, though, Resolution 1887 is a mixed blessing for internation-
al efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. While it commits to global
disarmament, it does not provide a tangible method to achieve this goal.
162. Baird, supra note 7, at 548-49.
163. See Falk, supra note 158, at 65.
164. Obama, supra note 127.
165. Id.
166. U.N. Doc. S/PV.6191, supra note 75, at 1.
167. Id. at 2-3 (remarks of U.S. President Barack Obama).
168. See David A. Koplow, How Do We Get Rid of These Things? Dismantling Excess
Weapons While Protecting the Environment, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 445, 450 (1995) ("Moreover,
several prominent international arrangements-notably, the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty-
are designed to inhibit the spread of a designated weapon capability, without directly requiring
the states that already possess the specified arms to dismantle or otherwise limit them.").
169. See Falk, supra note 158, at 65-66 (evaluating the ICJ advisory opinion on nuclear
weapons and the opinion's implicit criticism of the empty claims of NWS); Nanda, supra note
22, at 343-47 (describing NWS calling for disarmament in their white papers, but then failing
to honor those calls at the negotiating table); Ware, supra note 89, at 245-46 (arguing that the
NWS claim to support disarmament but enact policies that contradict that claim).
170. See Quentin Peel & Gerrit Wiesmann, NATO Pressed on Nuclear Disarmament, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/41 f93a76-flaO-1 ldf-bb5a-001 44feab49a.html
("If the nuclear powers disarm, they will be much more credible in insisting that other states
should not acquire nuclear weapons." (quoting German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle)).
171. S.C. Res. 1887, supra note 17, pmbl.
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A. Success-Changing the Rhetoric from
Nonproliferation to Disarmament
Resolution 1887 returns the concept of disarmament to a primary role in
the international nuclear regulatory regime. 72 The shift from nonprolifera-
tion to disarmament is significant, and if implemented in future international
regulation, it would significantly increase international security.
73
Disarmament should be the primary goal of an international regime
regulating nuclear weapons. 174 A nonproliferation regime has proven
difficult to maintain, as NWS have no motivation to reduce the size of their
arsenals.'75 The United States, for example, cannot in good faith seek to
curb proliferation when it houses one of the world's largest stockpiles and
plans to build a global missile shield.'76 As long as the United States
maintains its nuclear stockpile, its major geopolitical rivals, China and
Russia, will want to keep their arsenals as well. As long as China maintains
its arsenal, India will keep an arsenal to counter the perceived threat posed
by its neighbor. As long as India has weapons, Pakistan will keep
developing weapons to compete with its main international rival. Until these
states all agree to disarm, there can be no downward pressure on
proliferation. Focusing on disarmament would go a long way toward
helping global nuclear nonproliferation efforts.
Resolution 1887 recognizes the existential threat posed by nuclear
weapons. 7 7 It counsels states to "share best practices" to improve nuclear
172. Daniel H. Joyner, Recent Developments in International Law Regarding Nuclear
Weapons, 60 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 209, 212 (2011) ("Resolution 1887 is rather a unanimous
statement by the Security Council supporting nuclear disarmament and calling upon UN
Member States to redouble their efforts to achieve this goal.").
173. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 63, at 23-24. See also supra Part t.
174. See generally Randy Rydell, Nuclear Disarmament and General and Complete
Disarmament, in THE CHALLENGE OF ABOLISHING NUCLEAR WEAPONS 227, 227-40 (David
Krieger ed., 2009).
175. Nuclear weapons reductions have come as a result of bilateral and unilateral action
rather than as a result of international regulation. See, e.g., Nigel Morris, Britain Offers to Re-
duce Nuclear Arsenal in Disarmament Deal, INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 18, 2009,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/britain-offers-to-reduce-nuclear-arsenal-in-
disarmament-deal-1647364.html; France to Reduce Nuclear Warheads, BBCNEws.coM,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7308563.stm (last updated Mar. 21, 2008, 3:04 PM); Mi-
chael D. Shear, Obama, Medvedev Sign Treaty to Reduce Nuclear Weapons, WASH. POST.
(Apr. 8, 2010, 9:31 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/08/
AR2010040801677.html; see also PERKOVICH ET AL., supra note 52, at 16.
176. See Walter Pincus, Life Span of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Will Increase Under Plan,
WASH. POST, May 18, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/nationallife-span-of-us-nuclear-
weapons-will-increase-under-plan2011/05/18/AFYOen6G story.html (describing that the
United States is required under the START Treaty, supra note 145, to reduce its nuclear arse-
nal, but that in order to maintain its nuclear strength, it will extend the life span of existing
nuclear warheads by about thirty years); Vladimir Radyuhin, Duma Ratifies New Start, HIN-
DOU, Jan. 25, 2011, http://www.thehindu.com/news/intemational/article 1124801 .ece.
177. Nanda, supra note 22, at 336-37 (arguing that nuclear weapons are the gravest
threat to nuclear security); Chesney, supra note 37, at 82.
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safety and reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism.178 And it seeks to secure "all
vulnerable nuclear material . . . within four years." 179 Both intersiate cooper-
ation and security improvements are necessary to prevent rogue states and
terrorist organizations from obtaining nuclear weapons. Resolution 1887
calls for states to "detect, deter, and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear ma-
terials." 80 In addition, it calls for increased monitoring of nuclear
materials. 8' It also is "gravely concerned" with the threat of "nuclear terror-
ism" and recognizes that all states need to take "effective measures to
prevent nuclear material or technical assistance [from] becoming available
to terrorists."' 82 Here, the Resolution recognizes that open borders have fa-
cilitated the flow of nuclear materials and spawned dangerous networks that
encourage proliferation. Unlike the NPT, then, Resolution 1887's concerns
are not the traditional fears of state-to-state proliferation. Resolution 1887,
rather, recognizes the unique challenge that globalization presents to non-
proliferation.
Resolution 1887 covers the major issues that an ideal international re-
gime would focus on. It prioritizes disarmament over nonproliferation. It
recognizes that the world has changed since the Cold War and that a com-
prehensive, international effort is necessary to track nuclear networks.
Finally, it explicitly mentions the threat to security posed by terrorists armed
with nuclear weapons. Thus, Resolution 1887 provides an ideological
framework for a potential new regulatory regime.
B. Shortcomings-Ties to the Past
Resolution 1887 has three major flaws that prevent it from becoming an
ideal regime for nuclear disarmament. Specifically, Resolution 1887 remains
attached to the problem-laden NPT regime, does not exclusively focus on
disarmament, and lacks concrete benchmarks and enforcement procedures.
First, Resolution 1887 attempts to salvage the existing regulatory re-
gime. 83 The resolution holds itself to be "in accordance with the goals of
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)."'184 The end
of the resolution calls on states to uphold their commitments to the NPT re-
gime rather than develop a new strategy for dealing with nuclear weapons.'85
Moreover, the resolution repeatedly refers to the importance of upholding
178. S.C. Res. 1887, supra note 17, 24.
179. Id.
180. Id. 26.
181. Id. 28.
182. Id. pmbl.
183. Joyner, supra note 172, at 211 ("It essentially restates and supports a number of al-
ready existing legal obligations, and identifies and supports efforts to create new
obligations.").
184. S.C. Res. 1887, supra note 17, pmbl.
185. Id. 2.
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various facets of the NPT regime."' Resolution 1887 should break from this
Cold War relic and formulate a new, more expansive nuclear regime cen-
tered on disarmament. Maintaining the NPT weakens Resolution 1887's
legitimacy, particularly in the eyes of nonnuclear states. NNWS feel that
maintaining the framework of the NPT perpetuates the power disparity be-
tween NWS and NNWS. 8 7 Thus, NNWS will likely view Resolution 1887,
alongside the recent renewal of the NPT, as a tool for cementing the NWS'
existing nuclear monopoly.188
Second, Resolution 1887 fails to focus exclusively on disarmament. 8 9
While promoting disarmament, the resolution also reaffirms that "the prolif-
eration of weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery,
constitutes a threat to international peace and security."' 9° The resolution is
thus noticeably silent about the legality of the possession and use of nuclear
weapons. Reaffirming nonproliferation, moreover, is antithetical to dis-
armament efforts. While disarmament encompasses nonproliferation, each
goal has a very different focus.1 9' Nonproliferation focuses on preventing
nonnuclear states from obtaining weapons without scrutiny of nuclear states
themselves. Disarmament, though, focuses on eliminating all nuclear weap-
ons and examines the actions of both nuclear and nonnuclear states.' 92 As
long as the resolution remains tied to the language of nonproliferation, it
will be incredibly difficult to make a strong push towards disarmament.' 93
Finally, Resolution 1887 lacks concrete goals and enforcement mecha-
nisms. It only requests that all states work to create and enforce "a Treaty on
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control."' 19 4 The resolution, then, is merely aspirational; it does not provide
concrete benchmarks or suggestions for enforcement. Enforcement is neces-
sary because of the fear that a state seeking nuclear energy is also
186. See id. [ 2-5. The Security Council called upon "States Parties to the NPT to
comply fully with all their obligations and fulfil their commitments under the Treaty" and
commented "that enjoyment of the benefits of the NPT by a State Party can be assured only by
its compliance with the obligations thereunder." Id. 2-3. The Security Council also called
upon "Parties to the NPT, pursuant to Article Vt of the Treaty, to undertake to pursue negotia-
tions in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear arms reduction and disarmament."
Id. 5.
187. See discussion supra notes 151-157 and accompanying text; see also PERKOVtCI
ET AL., supra note 52, at 16; Nanda, supra note 22, at 343-46.
188. PERKOVICH ET AL., supra note 52, at 16.
189. Sharon Riggle, Could the Non-Proliferation Treaty Collapse? The Uncertain Road
Ahead, DISARMAMENT F., no. 1, 2000, at 29, 35.
190. S.C. Res. 1887, supra note 17, $ 1.
191. Jonathan Granoff, Nuclear Weapons, Ethics, Morals, and Law, 2000 BYU L. REV.
1413, 1417 n.17.
192. Id.
193. Roser, supra note 152 (describing the distrust of the nonproliferation regime). But
see U.N. Doc. S/PV.6191, supra note 75, at 4 (comments of Ban Ki Moon) ("[D]isarmament
and nonproliferation must proceed together.").
194. S.C. Res. 1887, supra note 17, 5.
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attempting to create nuclear weapons. 195 Unfortunately, like many similar
resolutions and treaties,1 96 there is neither an enforcement regime in place to
make sure that the technologies given to a nonnuclear state are solely for ci-
vilian energy uses nor a proper check on the activities of the nonnuclear
state. Resolution 1887 aims for the goal of disarmament but will likely fall
short of achieving that goal.
IV. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR FUTURE INTERNATIONAL
REGULATION -REPLACING MUTUAL DISTRUST
WITH MUTUAL COOPERATION
The nuclear weapons regulatory regime is in need of a major overhaul.
Resolution 1887 is a strong first step in moving from distrust among NWS and
NNWS to cooperation between them.197 Both types of states can tap into the
widespread public support for global disarmament. 19 Until a binding interna-
tional regulation is in place, however, achieving this goal will be difficult. 199
195. Roger Cohen, Op-Ed., [ran, the Paper Tiger, N.Y TIMES (Oct. 1I, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/12/opinion/]2iht-edcohen.html (describing the overreaction
of Western countries to Iran's pursuit of nuclear power, and doubting Iran's ability to produce
a nuclear weapon); Roger F. Noriega, Chdvez's Secret Nuclear Program, FOREIGN POL,'Y (Oct.
5, 2010), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/05/chavez-s-secret-nuclear-program
(documenting Venezuela's initial interest in acquiring nuclear power and the nuclear-weapons
states' suspicions of these actions). Consider Iran's quest for nuclear power and the fear that
they will use the technology to create nuclear weapons. See Ali Akbar Dareini, Iran: Nuclear
Delay Due to Leak, Not Computer Worm, USATODAY.COM (Oct. 4, 2010, 4:12 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/2010-10-04-iran-nuclear-delayN.htm ("Iran denies
any nuclear weapons ambitions and says its program is only for peaceful purposes like power
generation and medical research."); see also Gloag, supra note 7, at 1547 (comparing the risks
associated with nuclear technology with the benefits of clean, efficient energy).
196. See, e.g., Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Justice Lost! The Failure of
International Human Rights Law to Matter Where Needed Most, 44 J. PEACE RES. 407, 413-
14 (2007) (noting that states often comply with international norms, but discussing how there
are still serious problems with international law compliance); Andrew W. Samaan, Note, En-
forcement of International Environmental Treaties: An Analysis, 5 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV.
261, 263-69 (1993) (noting failures in enforcing international environmental treaties).
197. See Koplow & Schrag, supra note 94, at 1008 (arguing that cooperation is essential
to achieving the goal of disarmament).
198. See Samina Ahmed et al., Public Opinion and Nuclear Options for South Asia, 38
ASIAN SURV. 727, 739 (1998) ("[A] whopping 94 percent in India and 97 percent in Pakistan
expressed total or partial support for an international agreement to ban nuclear weapons, with
only 1 percent opposed in India and none in Pakistan."); Ware, supra note 89, at 271 ("An ap-
peal calling for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons has gained over 60 million signatures, making
it the largest petition in the world."); What Is Global Zero, GLOBAL ZERO,
http://www.globalzero.org/en/about-campaign (last visited Apr. 13, 2012) (petitioning for a
world without nuclear weapons; the petition has already received over 400,000 signatures).
199. See Permanent Reps. of Costa Rica and Malaysia to the U.N., Model Nuclear
Weapons Convention, transmitted by Letter dated 17 December 2007 from the Permanent
Reps. of Costa Rica and Malaysia to the U.N. addressed to the Secretary-General, at 1, U.N.
Doc. A/62/650 (Jan. 18, 2008) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/62/650], available at http://daccess-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/213/77/PDF/N0821377.pdfOpenElement (arguing that
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Either through a binding multilateral treaty 200 or a binding Security Council
resolution 2 0 1 --coupled with a supporting General Assembly resolution to
provide unanimity-the regulatory regime must be strengthened with
unambiguous language tied to concrete deadlines and rigorous inspection
and verification procedures.
20 2
Specifically, any successful regime must deter states from reneging on
their commitment to disarm. In the past, military, political, economic, and
moral consequences have seemingly dissuaded states from using nuclear
weapons. 20 3 These consequences need to be used as a stick to encourage dis-
armament. Moreover, there is precedent for international law to guide
weapons controls. States were able to come together and create a strong
regime governing both chemical and biological weapons.2" There is no rea-
son why they cannot do the same for nuclear weapons. 5 Yet there is more
the risks associated with nuclear weapons can only be "eliminated through the adoption of le-
gally binding, verifiable and enforceable instruments culminating in a comprehensive prohibi-
prohibition and destruction of all nuclear weapons under effective controls"). But see Ronald
J. Sievert, Working Toward a Legally Enforceable Non-Proliferation Regime, 34 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 93, 98-99, 101-06 (2010) (arguing that even a binding international regime could
not result in disarmament and providing a framework for a new NPT, which would focus on
creating binding legal rules against proliferation and first use).
200. Security Council Resolution 1887 itself calls for a disarmament treaty. S.C. Res.
1887, supra note 17, 5; see also Nanda, supra note 22, at 349-50 (describing the nuclear-
free-zone treaties, which have made the Southern Hemisphere virtually free of nuclear
weapons).
201. See Natasha Bajema & Mary Beth Nikitin, Assessing Nuclear Maturity: Determin-
ing Which States Should Have Access to What Nuclear Technology, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF.,
Summer 2004, at 157, 171-72 (arguing that the Security Council ought to take the lead on en-
forcing norms of the nonproliferation regime, but also highlighting the problems with this
approach); Garvey, supra note 108, at 346 ("The architecture best suited to maximizing and
solidifying the advantages of multilateralism and the capacity of the United Nations Charter
would be a Security Council resolution declaring nuclear weapons proliferation, whether in-
volving states or non-state actors, a 'threat to the peace."').
202. Editorial, The Nuclear Security Summit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2010, at A24 (arguing
that President Obama's 2010 Security Summit must result in concrete deadlines for the secur-
ing of fissile material); David Krieger, Remarks to the 4th Nagasaki Global Citizens'
Assembly for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons: A Nuclear Weapons Convention (Feb. 22,
2010) ("Verification must not have limiting factors. It must allow for full inspections. Coun-
tries must be prepared to open their facilities to challenge inspections at any time and in any
place."); see also Matheson, supra note 91, at 434-35 (arguing that negotiations, not court de-
cisions, will result in disarmament); Phillip R. Trimble, Beyond Verification: The Next Step in
Arms Control, 102 HARv. L. REV. 885, 895-86 (1989) (arguing that an ICJ decision outlawing
nuclear weapons would be ineffective).
203. E.g., Garcia, supra note 98, at 515, 547 ("Many military options are available but
never considered by the United States, for both moral and political reasons.").
204. See sources cited supra note 10.
205. See Nanda, supra note 22, at 346 ("Undoubtedly the only answer lies in nuclear-
weapon states' setting a firm timeframe for the elimination of nuclear weapons and agreeing
on specific, concrete steps toward that goal, and to implement them."). But see Falk, supra
note 158, at 65-66 (arguing that there is a deep ideological split between nations about the
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to a future disarmament regime than merely encouraging states toward dis-
armament and discouraging weapons use. New forms of international
regulation should utilize Resolution 1887 as a foundation, but strive to make
improvements to the regime and replace the broken bargain of the NPT .
20 6
Below are suggestions for ensuring that future international regulation con-
tinues to work toward the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.
A. Universality-Include Every Nation, Make Every Nation Equal
Nuclear disarmament is a global issue, yet the regulations that govern it
have not received universal endorsement. Resolution 1887 garnered
unanimous support from the Security Council; however, the Security
Council consists of only fifteen nations. 20 7 One hundred and eighty-nine
states are party to the NPT; however, of the six states that are not
signatories, four possess nuclear weapons. 20 8 The IAEA operates in states
that are not party to the NPT to counter increased proliferation, but the
IAEA does not have adequate legal, technical, or political authority to
govern nonproliferation and disarmament globally.209  There is an
opportunity to solve these problems so long as every nation agrees to a new
regulatory regime. If the regime were to come in the form of a Security
Council resolution, then a parallel General Assembly resolution signed by
every member state would be sufficient to express universality. The General
Assembly has already indicated its interest in disarmament by adopting a
resolution entitled "Nuclear Disarmament," which argues that now is the
opportune time to eliminate nuclear weapons.21 0
status of nuclear weapons, which makes the fashioning of a treaty governing nuclear weapons
like the Biological Weapons Convention or Chemical Weapons Convention unlikely).
206. See Epstein & Szasz, supra note 10, at 743 (stating that to overcome the provisions
of the NPT all states must elect to replace the NPT with a superseding treaty).
207. See Eckert, supra note 37, at 80 (claiming that there is often a suspicion that the Se-
curity Council acts as a conduit for U.S. policy, which could ultimately undermine the
effectiveness of Security Council policy); Ford, supra note 145, at 983-84; James Fry, Diony-
sian Disarmament: Security Council WMD Coercive Disarmament Measures and Their Legal
Implications, 29 MICH. J. INT'L L. 197, 286-87 (2008) (highlighting the drawbacks and bene-
fits of fifteen nations creating policy for the entire world).
208. Suleman, supra note 144, at 220 (criticizing the claim that most states are parties to
the NPT).
209. See PETER RILEY, NUCLEAR WASTE: LAW, POLICY AND PRAGMATISM 58 (2004) (de-
scribing how the IAEA is not as powerful as it was when it was first authorized in 1953);
Krieger, supra note 59, at 44, 49-50 (arguing that IAEA has the ability to recognize unauthor-
ized diversions of nuclear material, but does not have the capability to prevent these
violations); Sloss, supra note 124, at 847, 890 (arguing that the limits of IAEA will require
that it remain dependent on member states); Ling Zhong, Note, Nuclear Energy: China's Ap-
proach Towards Addressing Global Warming, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 493, 514 (2000)
("[T]he IAEA has no unilateral authority to place safeguards on any nation's nuclear program
unless a country voluntarily submits its nuclear materials and activities to IAEA safeguards
through bilateral or multilateral agreements between that country and the IAEA.").
210. Nuclear Disarmament, G.A. Res. 65/56, 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/56 (Jan. 13,
2011); see also Nanda, supra note 22, at 337-38.
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A new regime cannot allow any outlier states; universality must be
pursued.2 1 1 Such a regime would remedy the NPT's mistake of creating a
legal distinction between states with nuclear weapons and those without
nuclear weapons. 2 2 NWS must lead this charge away from the dichotomy of
the NPT and toward a unified disarmament regime. The passage of a
multilateral treaty or a binding Security Council resolution, coupled with a
General Assembly resolution, designed to eliminate nuclear weapons would
signal a fundamental shift in the global regulation of weapons.
213
B. Inspection and Verification-Build upon the IAEA
Resolution 1887 "stresses the importance for all Member States to en-
sure that the IAEA continue to have all the necessary resources and
authority to verify the declared use of nuclear materials and facilities and
the absence of undeclared activities, and for the IAEA to report to the
Council accordingly as appropriate.11214 Yet the resolution fails to mandate
that states support the IAEA monetarily or adhere to IAEA inspections.
The IAEA represents an integral part of the international regulatory re-
gime, without which the collection of information on nuclear materials
would be limited to espionage. 215 The IAEA maintains an account of the
worldwide supply of nuclear materials. 16 Moreover, the IAEA has the abil-
ity to conduct special unannounced investigations into member states when
necessary.217 It does an excellent job of providing credible and reliable in-
formation on nuclear materials across the globe.2 18
However, the IAEA could also be improved in several ways. The IAEA,
for instance, requires a larger budget to conduct deeper investigations into
claims while maintaining its current operations.2 9 The IAEA should also
211. Ivo Daalder & Jan Lodal, Logic of Zero: Toward a World Without Nuclear Weapons,
FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2008, at 80, 90.
212. Ford, supra note 145, at 940; Koplow & Schrag, supra note 94, at 1013-14.
213. Koplow & Schrag, supra note 94, at 1013-18 (suggesting that a new non-
proliferation regime should not distinguish between NWS and NNWS and should "focus
attention on real disarmament, rather than on partial or interim measures").
214. S.C. Res. 1887, supra note 17, T 15.
215. Jonas & Swift, supra note 59, at 348.
216. Daniel C. Rislove, Global Warming v. Non-Proliferation: The Time Has Come for
Nations to Reassert Their Right to Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, 24 Wis. INT'L L.J. 1069,
1088 (2007).
217. Sloss, supra note 124, at 863-64.
218. Ford, supra note 145, at 942 (describing the importance of the IAEA in Iran);
George Jahn, Syria to End Nuclear Secrecy, GUARDIAN (London) (May 29, 2011),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9670525/print (describing the integral role that
an IAEA report had in changing Syria's policy on transparency in its nuclear program).
219. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-93, NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION:
IAEA HAS STRENGTHENED ITS SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR SECURITY PROGRAMS, BUT
WEAKNESSES NEED TO BE ADDRESSED 34-37 (2005) (describing the IAEA's heavy reliance on
voluntary contributions from the United States in order to support its limited budget); Karen
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receive greater backing from the international community. If a nation fails to
comply with IAEA inspections, the Security Council should be authorized
to take immediate action.220 The IAEA should also allow for challenge in-
spections, which would utilize the resources of nations to check nuclear
programs . 2 1 Another suggestion to further improve transparency in nuclear
technology, advocated by the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, is to have the
U.N. Security Council ask all nations to produce white papers declaring
stockpiles of fissile materials. 2 2 The IAEA could help manage and enforce
such a request.
Finally, the IAEA's verification process should be supplemented
through domestic verification procedures. A verification policy laid out by
the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy's Model Nuclear Weapons
Convention (Model Convention) would provide an ideal supplement. The
Model Convention supplements the standard verification procedures by
encouraging individual citizens to report anomalies in the regime, offering
an additional layer of national security to protect against nuclear weap-
ons. 223 If this policy were implemented it would provide an ideal
supplement to high-level IAEA inspections because there would be checks
on nations from above and below.
C. Enforcement-Mandate Sanctions When Terms Are Violated
The most poignant criticism of the current regulatory regime is its lack
of enforcement capability.24 In the past, NPT states have tried to punish
states that tested or developed nuclear weapons. However, the prospect of
punishment has done little to deter states from developing nuclear
McMillan, Strengthening the International Legal Framework for Nuclear Energy, 13 GEo.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 983, 1007-08 (2001).
220. The IAEA merely has the power to report noncompliance to the Security Council
but does not have any ability to promote action on behalf of the Security Council against a
particular state. See IAEA, Statute of the IAEA art. XII(C), opened for signature Oct. 26,
1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093, 276 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter IAEA Statute], available at
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTSNolume%20276/volume-276-1-3988-English.pdf;
Diana L.W. Fernandez, Note, Nuclear Proliferation: Dim Prospects for Control, 3 BROOK. J,
INT'L L. 57, 63 (1977) ("[T]he Statute... charges the IAEA with safeguarding against the di-
version of fissionable material from peaceful purposes to nuclear weaponry without giving the
JAEA mandatory powers of enforcement.").
221. Sloss, supra note 124, at 887 n.233 (describing challenge inspections that would
allow states to instigate an investigation that could only be blocked by a supramajority vote).
222. PERKOVICI- ET AL., supra note 52, at 155.
223. U.N. Doc. A/62/650, supra note 199, at 8 ("Persons reporting suspected violations
of the convention will be provided protection through the Convention including the right of
asylum."); Ware, supra note 89, at 273.
224. Thomas J. Daemen, Comment, The Need for Liability Constraints in Successful
High-Technology Development: A Comparison of the French and U.S. Commercial Nuclear
Programs, 13 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 684, 699 (1993); Koplow & Schrag, supra note 94, at
1022; Sloss, supra note 124, at 890 ("[W]ithout a cognizable threat of sanctions for noncom-
pliance, some states may breach their obligations with impunity .... ").
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weapons. 225 In 1974, for instance, India launched its first nuclear test.226 All
Western nuclear states immediately cut off any foreign aid to India. 227 Un-
fortunately, India still clandestinely pursued a nuclear program throughout
the 1980s before publically declaring its weapons in 1998.228 In the past,
sanctions have been used unsuccessfully as a discretionary enforcement
mechanism. With India, for example, the sanctions came primarily from
Western states, leaving India free to purchase goods from the former Soviet
Union and other nonsanctioning states.22 9 An example of this phenomenon is
currently taking place with Iran. As the international community levies the
threat of sanctions, the regime in Tehran seems ever more defiant.
230
Sanctions, though, if implemented correctly, can be an effective method
of enforcing a future nuclear disarmament regime. 23' The new regime should
embrace sanctions that are universal, targeted, and automatic. While unilat-
eral sanctions against potential nuclear states have occasionally proven
effective, 232 universal sanctions ensure that a potential violator cannot by-
pass the regime by trading with other states. Moreover, unilateral sanctions
225. See, e.g., Eckert, supra note 37, at 72-73 (describing how the failure of Security
Council Resolution 1737, supra note 16, to curb Iran's pursuance of nuclear technology out-
side the NPT regime, can also be traced to a lack of adequate sanctioning).
226. Sumit Ganguly, India's Pathway to Pokhran I: The Prospects and Sources of New
Delhi's Nuclear Weapons Program, INT'L SECURITY, Spring 1999, at 148, 148.
227. PEIMANI, supra note 140, at 10.
228. See David Albright, The Shots Heard 'Round the World, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS,
July 1998, at 20, 20-24 (describing India's use of three simultaneous detonations to announce
its presence as a nuclear power, which caught the world off-guard at the time).
229. Brahma Chellaney, South Asia's Passage to Nuclear Power, INT'L SECURITY,
Summer 1991, at 43, 52 ("After India's 1974 nuclear explosion, the international nonprolifera-
tion regime was restructured to make safeguards and export controls the major political and
security instruments of the greater nuclear powers. This, however, did little to stem prolifera-
tion trends on the subcontinent."); Ganguly, supra note 226, at 158-60 (describing Western
condemnation of India's first nuclear test in 1974 and the strategic arms and support alignment
with the Soviet Union).
230. Eckert, supra note 37, at 73. But see Edith M. Lederer, Sanctions Slow Iran Nukes
Program, ABC NEWS, May 11, 2011, http://abcnews.go.comIUS/wireStory?id=13573807 (ar-
guing that U.N. sanctions are having a significant effect on Iran's nuclear program).
231. See, e.g., GARY C. HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: His-
TORY AND CURRENT POLICY 41 (2d ed. 1990) (noting that the success of sanctions is partly
measured by domestic satisfaction and discussing the pleasure of "domestic political constitu-
encies" regarding sanctions by the United States and Europe against South African apartheid,
Britain against Argentina over the Falklands crisis, and the United States against China in re-
sponse to the Tiananmen Square massacre); Barry E. Carter, International Economic
Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1159, 1163 (1987)
(noting the success of U.S. sanctions against Duvalier in Haiti, against Idi Amin in 1979, and
in preventing South Korea from buying a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant from France in
1975-76). See generally MEGHAN L. 0' SULLIVAN, SHREWD SANCTIONS: STATECRAFT AND
STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM, 292-96 (2003) (arguing that the effectiveness of sanctions is
based on how "shrewdly" they are utilized).
232. See Kittrie, supra note 159, at 434, 436.
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can have a costly impact on the sanctioning country.23 3 For instance, the
U.S. sanctions against Iran and Cuba have hurt U.S. businesses, while Euro-
pean and Asian states have been able to easily capture these markets.
2 11
Empirically, though, universal sanctions have a better track record of suc-
cess as they put increasing pressure on a rogue state to conform to
international norms.2 35 While not effective in every case, universal sanctions
are politically more palatable than proposing armed intervention and not as
toothless as a diplomatic rebuke. Ultimately, universal sanctions are harder
to bypass, signal international consensus on an issue, and are arguably more
effective than unilateral sanctions. 36
To make universal sanctions more effective, the regime must apply them
automatically. While the regime could ensure that the degree of the punish-
ment is proportional to the offense, the regime should embrace a strict
liability method of applying the punishment. Presently, the IAEA submits a
report of noncompliance to the Security Council and the Security Council is
responsible for sanctioning countries that fail to comply with IAEA inspec-
tors or defy the NPT.237 The Security Council, however, can deliberate for
233. See HOSSEIN ASKARI ET AL., CASE STUDIES OF U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: THE
CHINESE, CUBAN, AND IRANIAN EXPERIENCE 257 (2003); William H. Kaempfer & Anton D.
Lowenberg, Alternatives to Comprehensive Sanctions 4 (Ctr. for Econ. Analysis, Working Pa-
per No. 00-17, 2000) (noting high costs for the United States when it imposed a grain
embargo against the Soviet Union during the Carter administration).
234. See M. Shervin Majlessi, Use of Economic Sanctions Under International Law: A
Contemporary Assessment, 39 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 253, 327 n.343 (2001) (describing unilateral
sanctions as a last resort strategy, after multilateral sanctions have failed because of globaliza-
tion and the intertwined nature of modem economies); Harry Wolff, Note, Unilateral
Economic Sanctions: Necessary Foreign Policy Tool or Ineffective Hindrance on American
Businesses?, 6 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 329, 350-51 (2006) (quoting Vice President Dick
Cheney in a 2004 debate in which he outlined the domestic costs and foreign benefits of uni-
lateral sanctions). For the views of a broad-based business coalition designed to explain the
shortcomings of the United States' unilateral sanction regime, see NFTC and USA*Engage
Statement Opposing Senate Banking Committee's Vote on Iran Sanctions, USA ENGAGE,
http://usaengage.nonprofitsoapbox.com/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=676 (last
visited Apr. 22, 2012) (arguing against unilateral sanctions on Iran).
235. See Roy E. HORTON, OUT OF (SOUTH) AFRICA: PRETORIA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS
EXPERIENCE 29 (1999) (describing the failure of unilateral U.S. sanctions to curb South Africa's
nuclear ambitions); Wolff, supra note 234, at 341-43 (describing the effectiveness of multilateral
sanctions and the relative ineffectiveness of unilateral sanctions in Libya and Syria).
236. See Charles Breckinridge, Sanction First, Ask Questions Later: The Shortsighted
Treatment of Iran Under the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, 88 GEO. L.J. 2439, 2469
(2000) ("[Tlhe United States should only employ these targeted sanctions when it has the sup-
port of its allies .... If such multilateral support existed for these efforts, then the sanctions
would sting the target, not American companies...."); Richard W. Parker, The Problem with
Scorecards: How (and How Not) to Measure the Cost-Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions,
21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 235, 291 n.197 (2000) (describing how unilateral sanctions do not work,
but multilateral sanctions can sometimes work). But see Adeno Addis, Economic Sanctions
and the Problem of Evil, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 573, 583 (2003) (arguing that sanctions were inef-
fective in the cases of both Afghanistan and Iraq).
237. Fernandez, supra note 220, at 62-66; see IAEA Statute, supra note 220 (showing
that the IAEA merely has the power to report non-compliance to the Security Council but does
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some time before taking action,238 and given the realities of international
politics, its record for sanctioning parties pursuing nuclear weapons has
been inconsistent. 23 9 Moreover, the five permanent members of the Security
Council all possess nuclear weapons, weakening the legitimacy of their de-
cisions in the eyes of the international community
41
Making sanctions subject to political deliberation thus creates some un-
certainty as to whether they will be applied and be applied consistently.24
The current regime requires a unanimous vote by the Security Council to
impose or relieve the sanctions.2 4 2 As a result, an offending state may be
more likely to violate the regime, knowing that there is a chance it will not
be punished. An automatic sanctions regime would make punishment the
default, only to be abrogated in exceptional cases.143
Finally, the sanctions should be targeted. 24 Targeted sanctions involve a
number of restrictions (economic, political, and diplomatic) directed at the
materials necessary to create or maintain a nuclear weapon system.
245
not have any ability to promote action on behalf of the Security Council against a particular
state). See also discussion supra note 220 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., Matthew Lund, The Eighty Percent and Twenty Percent Solutions to Nu-
clear Proliferation, 2009 BYU L. REV. 741, 756-57 (discussing how the Security Council
dealt with Iran's noncompliance with resolutions starting in August 2006 and continuing into
March 2008).
239. See, e.g., Roger Normand & Christoph Wilcke, Human Rights, Sanctions, and Ter-
rorist Threats: The United Nations Sanctions Against Iraq, 11 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 299, 316 (2001) (describing the lack of international sanctions against Israel after it
pursued nuclear weapons).
240. See George Perkovich & James Acton, Enforcement, in ABOLISHING NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, supra note 143, at 99, 104 (describing the difficult role that the permanent five
members of the Security Council would play in a disarmament debate at the Security Council
considering that they all possess nuclear weapons); Ganguly, supra note 226, at 174 (describ-
ing how India, in 1974, utilized the justification that all five permanent members of the
Security Council possessed nuclear weapons to justify its own nuclear program).
241. See, e.g., Laurence Norman, Unfreezing Libyan Assets 101, WSJ BLOG: REAL TIME
BRUSSELS (Aug. 26, 2011, 6:26 AM), http:/Iblogs.wsj.combrussels/2011/08/26/unfreezing-
libyan-assets-101/ (noting that one of the ways to get assets unfrozen is for the U.N. Sanctions
Committee of the Security Council to vote unanimously).
242. See generally U.N. Charter art. 41 (providing the Security Council with the power
to levy sanctions).
243. For a discussion of how international sanctions regimes keep wayward states in
line, see generally Christopher C. Joyner, Collective Sanctions as Peaceful Coercion: Lessons
from the United Nations Experience, 16 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 241, 266 (1995).
244. See Garvey, supra note 108, at 350-53 (targeting sanctions to persons involved in
nuclear activities is most effective).
245. MIKAEL ERIKSSON, TARGETING PEACE: UNDERSTANDING UN AND EU TARGETED
SANCTIONS 1 (2011) ("Targeted sanctions involve measures such as financial sanctions, travel
bans, arms embargoes, trade sanctions, flight bans, admissions restrictions, diplomatic sanc-
tions, boycotts .... "); Dawn L. Rothe et al., Torture, Impunity, and Open Legal Spaces: Abu
Ghraib and International Controls, 12 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 27, 34 (2009) (describing a range
of targeted sanctions that can be implemented by the United Nations, including arms embar-
goes, travel bans, financial restrictions, diplomatic restrictions, freezing of assets, and
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Moreover, targeted sanctions focus on cutting off military access to those
materials while ensuring that citizens continue to have their basic necessi-
ties, such as food and medicine. 46 Targeted sanctions are a staple of the
international system 247 and have been effective in the past.2
48
One criticism of targeted sanctions is that the current Security Council
sanction regime already utilizes targeted sanctions focused on eliminating
materials essential to weapons production 249 and still has not been entirely
effective .25  The problem with these sanctions, though, is not that they are
targeted. Rather, the sanctions by the Security Council have not been
deployed rapidly and have lacked sufficient support from nations outside the
Security Council. In another criticism of targeted sanctions, scholars have
argued that comprehensive sanctions are a more effective method of
deterring divergence from a regime. 251 Comprehensive sanctions, though,
can devastate a country's civilian population and should only be used in
exceptional cases. 25 2
blocking transactions of political elites). See generally Christopher C. Joyner, United Nations
Sanctions After Iraq: Looking Back to See Ahead, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 329, 331 (2003) ("A dec-
laration by the Security Council of a sanctions decision legally obligates all member
governments of the UN to impose and enforce the stipulated restrictive measures against the
targeted state. In this regard, UN sanctions more closely resemble mandatory economic coer-
cion than tools of international trade or diplomacy.").
246. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg, Economic Sanctions: Public Goals and
Private Compensation, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 305, 328 n.52 (2003) ("Targeted sanctions are in-
tended to focus their impact on leaders, political elites, and segments of society believed to be
responsible for the objectionable behavior."); Lund, supra note 238, at 773 ("[Tlargeted sanc-
tions are designed to hit a nation's leaders where it will hurt them....").
247. Jane Boulden & Andrea Charron, Evaluating UN Sanctions, 65 INT'L J. 1, 7-8
(2009).
248. See Susan S. Gibson, International Economic Sanctions: The Importance of Gov-
ernment Structures, 13 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 161, 233-35 (1999) (describing the relative
success of targeted sanctions, particularly when compared to comprehensive sanctions, but
also noting the difficulty in applying targeted sanctions).
249. See Boulden & Charron, supra note 247, at 8-9 (arguing that "the effectiveness of
targeted sanctions remains an open question"); Lund, supra note 238, at 773-75 (describing
the two-step process of imposing targeted sanctions).
250. See Orde F. Kittrie, Emboldened by Impunity: The History and Consequences of
Failure to Enforce Iranian Violations of International Law, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 519, 544-47
(2007) (describing the ineffectiveness of targeted sanctions, particularly in the case of Iran).
251. See, e.g., James C. McMillin, Book Review, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 867, 872
(1990) (reviewing M. MALLOY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND U.S. TRADE (1990)) ("Based upon
this empirical data, Mr. Malloy concludes that the most effective sanctions programs are the
ones that are most comprehensive and the least effective programs (most notably Nicaragua)
impose a limited range of sanctions lacking intensive coordination or enforcement." (footnote
omitted)).
252. Kirk L. Wolcott, Seeking Effective Sanctions, 11 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 351, 357-58
(1997) (explaining that in Iraq, comprehensive sanctions were effective in curbing Saddam
Hussein's regime but also devastated the civilian population).
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Sanctions provide a strong incentive not to defy the mandates of a nu-
clear regulatory regime." 3 The main enforcement mechanism of any future
disarmament regime should be sanctions, but the sanctions must be rapidly
deployed, universal, automatic, and targeted.
D. Limit Domestic Control over Fissile Material
The unilateral conduct of NWS has reduced the supply of fissile materi-
al available to NNWS. The problem with this regime is that not all states
are fully invested; thus, there can be leaks of material from time to time.
25 4
Moreover, NWS refuse to reduce their supply of fissile material because
they require weapons to serve as a deterrent against other countries pos-
sessing or creating nuclear weapons.255
Ending the production of fissile material was one of the three key steps
toward disarmament outlined by President Barack Obama in his 2009
speech in Prague.256 This requirement must be applied to both NWS and
NNWS.257 Mandating the end of domestic production of fissile material
would be an incredibly strong step towards disarmament, but it must be
coupled with international requirements and controls.
Domestic control of the nuclear fuel cycle leads to fears of proliferation
and armament.258 Therefore, international law must also require nations to
de-enrich fuel, both unspent and spent, so that it no longer poses a risk of
proliferation. 259 Some domestic nuclear research reactors continue to use
weapons-grade material for fuel; these plants must be renovated to make use
of lower-grade material that does not pose a risk of proliferation.160 New
power plants based on so-called fast reactor technology utilize spent fuel for
253. See Koplow & Schrag, supra note 94, at 1014-15 (arguing that halfway measures
will no longer be effective in nonproliferation or disarmament).
254. See id.
255. ElBaradei, supra note 151 (describing how nuclear weapons are valued precisely
"for their perceived deterrent effect"). But see Daniel S. Geller, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence,
and Crisis Escalation, 34 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 291, 302 (1990) (finding that nuclear weapons
have no deterrent effect on NNWS).
256. Obama, supra note 127.
257. See supra Part I.B.2. (discussing the inherent problems with an asymmetrical re-
gime).
258. See Azaran, supra note 97, at 416; Matthew L. Wald, Risk from Spent Nuclear Re-
actor Fuel Is Greater in U.S. than in Japan, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2011, at B4
(discussing the renewed fears associated with spent nuclear fuel in light of the Fukishimi Nu-
clear Power Plant disaster).
259. Nuclear fuel de-enrichment is the process by which highly enriched uranium, which
is used for nuclear weapons, is diluted to low-enriched uranium, which is used for nuclear re-
actor fuel. See Andrew George, "Megatons to Megawatts": The U.S. -Russia Highly Enriched
Uranium Agreement, CENTER FOR DEF. INFO. (May 14, 2004), http://www.cdi.org/program/
document.cfm?documentid=2210&programlD=32.
260. Kraska, supra note 37, at 744 ("Approximately 130 research reactors in dozens of
countries around the world still use weapons-grade HEU.").
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power.26 ' There are proliferation concerns about this process, however, be-
cause of the enriched uranium and plutonium that results from recycling
spent fuel.262 Technology exists to de-enrich spent fuel to less than 20%,
thus making the fuel incapable of reaching weapons-grade.2 63 International
law should mandate that new nuclear power plants utilize the Radkowsky
Thorium Reactor, which uses the element thorium to create a denatured
form of uranium that cannot be utilized to create a weapon.26 Thus, there is
a need for a reciprocal agreement that allows for international controls to
govern unspent, spent, and reprocessed fuel.
265
A recent development signals a possible method for exerting interna-
tional control over nuclear fissile material. Billionaire Warren Buffet has
pledged fifty million dollars to the IAEA to help set up a global nuclear fuel
bank.266 The global nuclear fuel bank would house fuel stores, ensuring
safety, and would enable the trade of nuclear materials without fear of pro-
liferation.2 67 By using a fuel bank, the international community would limit
the risk of a state utilizing a domestic energy program for the purpose of
producing weapons. States, however, must support such a program if it is to
become a reality.
261. William H. Hannum et al., Smarter Use of Nuclear Waste, Sci. AM., Dec. 2005, at
84, 87-88.
262. Jan Willem Storm van Leeuwen, Into the Unknown: Fueling Civil Nuclear Power,
in SECURE ENERGY?, supra note 85, at 21; see also Seth Grae, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty's Obligation to Transfer Peaceful Nuclear Energy Technology: One Proposal of a
Technology, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1985, 1987-88 (1996) (describing the process of spent
fuel reprocessing and the proliferation concerns that arise as a result).
263. Kraska, supra note 37, at 727; Francesco Calogero, Chairman, Pugwash Council,
Address at the Nobel Peace Prize Centennial Symposium: The Conflicts of the 20th Century
and the Solutions for the 21st Century (Dec. 7, 2001), available at http://www.pugwash.orgl
septemberl I/septl 1-calogero.htm ("But clearly the most effective way to decrease the risk of
nuclear terrorism is to eliminate altogether the basic raw material-HEU-needed for the easy
manufacture of nuclear explosive devices.... [I]t is enough to de-enrich HEU to, say, less
than 20%, so that it cannot be used[,] ... which is extremely difficult.., to reverse.").
264. Alex Galperin et al., Thorium Fuel for Light Water Reactors-Reducing Prolifera-
tion Potential of Nuclear Power Fuel Cycle, 6 Sci. & GLOBAL SECURITY 265, 265-66 (1997);
Grae, supra note 262, at 1997; Paul R. Kasten, Review of the Radkowsky Thorium Reactor
Concept, 7 Sci. & GLOBAL SECURITY 237, 237 (1998) ("[T]he [Radkowsky Thorium Reactor]
shows a substantial increase in proliferation resistance to weapons production due to the low
quality of the plutonium produced and to its lower production rate."); Abdulhafed A Mohamed
Elkhadrawi, Thorium Based Nuclear Reactors 38 (Sept. 2008) (unpublished M.S. dissertation,
University of Surrey), available at http://personal.ph.surrey.ac.uk/-phsl pr/msc.dissertations/
msc-diss-2008/abdulhafed-elkhadrawi-thorium-reactors-2008.pdf.
265. See, e.g., Rislove, supra note 216, at 1096.
266. William J. Broad, Buffett Helps Create Nuclear Fuel Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3,
2010, at A4.
267. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Nuclear weapons pose a very real danger to global security, one that has
not been adequately addressed by international law. As shown in Part I, the
presence of nuclear weapons creates a risk that they could be used by a ter-
rorist organization or a rogue state. The easy transportation of goods across
open borders, advances in enriching technology, and lax security systems in
countries such as Russia and Pakistan have increased this fear. There is also
no guarantee that states that currently possess nuclear weapons will not use
them in a potential altercation. Already, nuclear weapons have changed the
dynamics of several major global conflict zones-between India and Paki-
stan, North and South Korea, and Israel and Iran. 6 As the Kargil altercation
between India and Pakistan suggests, some states with nuclear weapons take
advantage of their nuclear shield to act more aggressively. States with nu-
clear rivals, such as Iran, have an incentive to obtain nuclear weapons to
equalize the asymmetry of power with their nuclear rival and to promote
their own self-preservation.
In addressing these dilemmas, the international community ought to
prioritize disarmament in any future nuclear regime. Doing so would curb
proliferation by reducing the security threat to aspiring nuclear powers and
would subsequently limit the possibility of terrorists using a nuclear attack.
The current NPT regime, however, is inadequate to address this task. It is a
relic of the Cold War, when it was effective primarily because nonnuclear
states were usually protected by either the United States' or the Soviet Un-
ion's nuclear umbrella. As argued in Part II, the NPT divided the world into
nuclear states and nonnuclear states and essentially codified the nuclear mo-
nopoly that the drafters of the NPT enjoyed. In a world where the source of
potential conflict is likely a terrorist attack or a regional war between rival
powers, a new nuclear weapons regulatory regime addressing these threats is
necessary.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1887 takes one step forward in
providing the basis for such a regime by confronting the issue of a potential
terrorist attack and putting disarmament at the heart of a potential new nu-
clear regulatory regime. It does, however, suffer from some serious
drawbacks. It erroneously remains tied to the NPT regime, it fails to exclu-
sively focus on disarmament, and it lacks any provisions to enforce a call for
disarmament. With a few modifications-promoting universality, improving
verification and enforcement, and limiting domestic control over fissile
material-Resolution 1887 can provide a promising framework for an effec-
tive international nuclear regulatory regime.
268. See, e.g., Gharagozli, supra note 50, at 205 n.4 (describing how the acquisition of a
nuclear weapon by Iran could alter the rivalry between Iran and Israel); Sung Chul Yang,
South Korea's Sunshine Policy: Progress and Predicaments, FLETCHER F. WORLD Ar., Winter
2001, at 31, 37 (describing the "conflicting perceptions and perspectives" of the nuclear threat
between North and South Korea).
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